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Dobbertin: Eliminating Patient Dumping: A Proposal for Model Legislation

ELIMINATING PATIENT DUMPING:
A PROPOSAL FOR MODEL LEGISLATION
I. INTRODUCTION

It would shock the public conscience if a person in need of
medical emergency aid would be turned down at the door of
a hospital having emergency service because that person
could not at that moment assure payment for the services.
The public expects such service.'
As health care costs rise and the number of uninsured Americans increases,
the phenomenon known as patient dumpingj has become a problem of large

1. Mercy Medical Ctr. of Oshkosh v. Wnmebago County, 206 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Wis. 1973).
2. Patient dumping is defined as "the denial of emergency medical services or the premature
transfer of a patient from one hospital to another because the person cannot guarantee payment."
Geraldine Dallek & Judith Waxman, PatientDumping: A Crisis in EmergencyMedical Carefor the
Indigent, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1413 (1986).
There is also a problem known as reverse patient dumping, which occurs when a hospital with
improper resources attempts to transfer a patient to a larger, better equipped hospital, and the
hospital refuses to accept the transfer of the patient. SUBCOMM. ON HUMAN RESOURCES &
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS TO HOUSE COMM. ON GOVT. OPERATIONS, EQUAL ACCEss TO
HEALTH CARE: PATIENT DUMPING, H.R. REP. No. 531, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1988)
[hereinafter EQUAL ACCESS].
An example of reverse patient dumping was at issue in a Texas case where a small hospital
attempted to transfer a seventeen year old boy with a bullet lodged in his brain to a larger tertiary
care hospital. The larger hospital refused the transfer because they had a blanket policy that
uninsured or Medicaid patients would not be accepted by transfer. The boy's parents took him to
the larger hospital, and upon arrival the duty on the part of the hospital to render emergency care
arose under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Women in Active Labor Act (EMTALA). But
eight hours had passed and the boy died. Id. For a discussion of EMTALA, see infra notes 74-194
and accompanying text.
"Body Snatching" is another variation on the idea that patients are being treated and
transferred to hospitals based on their ability to pay for the services. When body snatching occurs,
a patient with insurance or the ability to pay for medical services is transferred from a public
hospital to a private hospital. Joe Calderone & Kevin McCoy, Hospital Hitfor "Body Snatching,"
NEWSDAY, Dec. 16, 1991, at 5. Some experts have stated that "self dumping" also occurs in
hospitals. Self dumping means that patients have found that it is worthless to go to the private
hospital where they know they will not be given care without medical insurance, so the patients go
directly to the public hospitals. Interview, PublicHospitals: Health Care's Safety Net, HOSPITALS,
March 20, 1989, at 76-77.
An example of the public's perception that hospitals dump patients without medical insurance
is the cdse of Mr. Milligan. Mr. Milligan was on vacation with his friend Mr. McElveen when
McElveen fell down a rocky waterfall. McElveen had no health insurance, so when Milligan took
him to the hospital Milligan represented McElveen as himself. Milligan's insurance company paid
$41,107.45 in medical bills for McElveen, but later found out that Milligan committed fraud.
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proportion.3 It is estimated that thirty-six million Americans, fifteen percent of
the population, have no health insurance. 4 The total annual cost of health care
for uninsured Americans is $9.7 billion.' These health care costs have led
hospitals to refuse to care for or dump patients who lack health insurance or are
indigen and unable to pay for the medical services.7 Approximately 250,000

McElveen and Milligan were both convicted of health care fraud. Milligan was sentenced to nine
months in prison; McEvleen was sentenced to seven months in prison.
Milligan claimed he misrepresented his insurance coverage because he feared that if payments
were not guaranteed, doctors would refuse to treat his friend without health insurance. Milligan's
friends had told him that the Tennessee hospitals were notorious for dumping uninsured patients.
Randy McClain, ID Swap ForBack OperationLands 2 Men in Prison; Man Says Friend'sLack of
InsurancePrompted Him To Lie Afier the Accident, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, February 14,
1993, at 47A.
For a general overview of patient dumping, see 104 A.L.R. FED. 166 (1992).
3. In a survey of health care chief executive officers, 13% of the officers found that patient
dumping occurred in hospitals in their geographic areas. Karen Pollarito, Patient Dumping
Occurring, Say 13% of CEO's, MOD. HEALTHCARE, June 22, 1992, at 24.
As the House Report on patient dumping stated:
Hospitals have been financially squeezed by cross currents of Medicaid payment
reductions, Medicare payment changes and growing nurnbers of uninsured patients. As
economic constrictions increase and hospital administrators are forced to act like
businessmen concerned mainly with profits, more and more patients will lose access to
desperately needed care simply because they cannot pay. Many hospitals have forsaken
their earlier commitment to patient access to health care for one of cost containment and
restraint.
EQUAL ACCESS, supra note 2, at 7.
4. Joanne S. Morrisey, FairCoverageforAU; Health InsurancePrescription,BEST'S REVIEW,
LIFE-HEALTH INSURANCE EDITION, Nov. 1992, at 57.

5. Id. Furthermore, 57% of Americans have health insurance through their employer, 12% are
covered by Medicare, 7 % by Medicaid, and 8% have other private coverage.
The total spending on healthcare in 1992 was $838.5 billion, more than 14% of the nation's
total economic production. Eric Weissenstein, Health Spending Hits $838 Billion in 1992, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, Jan. 11, 1993, at 2. Additionally, hospital expenditures alone amounted to $323.2
billion in 1992. It is estimated that in 1993 this amount will rise to $363 billion. Id.
6. Indigency is defined as "one who is needy and poor or one who has not sufficient property
to furnish him a living nor anyone able to support him to whom he is entitled to look for support."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 773 (6th ed. 1990).

In addition, people who are considered medically indigent include:
Those who by definition lack adequate health insurance, poor people who have no public
insurance, substantial numbers of unemployed or self employed persons who are
uninsured, many employees of small businesses that do not provide health care benefits,
elderly people eligible for Medicare but requiring extended-care facilities and services,
and patients in high-risk medical categories who are uninsurable.
Donald 0. Nutter, Medical Indigency and the Public Health Care Crisis, 7he Needfor a Definitive
Solution, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1156, 1156 (1987).
7. A study of Cook County hospitals that transferred patients from their emergency departments
showed that 87% of the patients were transferred because they lacked health insurance. Robert L.
Schiff, et al., Transfers to a Public Hospital, A Prospective Study of 467 Patients, 314 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 552, 555 (1986). The study also showed a dramatic increase in the number of interhospital
transfers. One Cook County Hospital showed increases from 1295 in 1980, to 2906 in 1981, 4368
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Most patient dumping takes place from

Consider the case of an uninsured pregnant woman who was in labor and
went to a private hospital."0 The hospital kept the woman in a wheelchair in
the lobby for two hours and fifteen minutes." Hospital administrators checked
the woman once, but performed no tests on the fetus."
The hospital
administrator then informed the woman that she must go to the nearest county
hospital. 3 At the county hospital the woman gave birth to a stillborn child.' 4
The case of Chandler v. HospitalAuthority of the City of Huntsville15 also
illustrates the patient dumping problem. In Chandler,a mother took her fifteenmonth-old child to the hospital, and the hospital refused to render treatment
unless the mother had medical insurance or a fifty-four dollar fee.' 6 The
mother was told to take the child home and give the child Tylenol and a warm
bath.' 7 The child died the next day from spinal meningitis.'
Hospitals, in
many cases, refuse to render treatment to patients because the hospitals fear that

in 1982, and 6769 in 1983. Id. at 552.
Additionally, the study found that the average treatment delay of 5.1 hours adversely affected
patients with certain conditions. Id. at 556.
8. David A. Ansell & Robert L. Schiff, Patient Dumping: Status, Implications and Policy
Recommendations, 257 J.A.M.A. 1500 (1987).
9. EQUAL ACCESS, supra note 2, at 2. In addition, the House Report indicated that many
patients may be transferred based on discrimination. Id. A recent study of patient transfers to a
Cook County hospital from other hospital emergency rooms showed that 89% of the transferred
patients were black or Hispanic. Schiff, supra note 7, at 552.
Patients who are discriminated against in receiving medical care may have a cause of action
for patient dumping under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973), or under the
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
10. EQUAL ACCESS, supra note 2, at 6. The House Report also discussed a case that involved
a diabetic who was suffering from acute ketoacidosis and was taken to a hospital for emergency
treatment. After the hospital admitted the patient, the hospital administrator lifted the patient out
of bed, walked him to the hospital parking lot, and left him there without a shirt or shoes. The
patient was uninsured and already owed the hospital money. The next day the patient died. An
investigation pursuant to EMTALA found no violation of the federal patient dumping statute. Id.
at 6.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. 548 So.2d 1384 (Ala. 1989).
16. Id. The court denied a motion for summary judgment.
17. Id. This action by the hospital triggered the common law duty to act although no legal duty
to act existed before such action.
18. Id.
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the patients will be unable to pay the medical bill.'9
Historically, a hospital could refuse to treat any patient without explanation
because there was no legal duty to render care.' Courts slowly eroded this
common law no duty rule by holding that if a patient relied on a custom of the
hospital to render aid, there was an implied duty on the hospital's part to care
for the patient.2 Additionally, if a hospital began to render care, it could be
held liable if it failed to continue the care, even though no legal duty to act
existed before the voluntary act.'
The first federal response to the patient dumping problem, the Hill-Burton
Act,' was passed in 1946. The most recent federal attempt to regulate patient
dumping, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Women in Active Labor Act
(EMTALA), was passed in 1986. The existing federal patient dumping laws
have not effectively monitored or enforced the provisions requiring medical
facilities to provide emergency medical care.'
State legislatures also have
responded to the patient dumping problem by enacting statutory regulations

19. This fear is rational on the hospital's part given that indigent patients have no ready means
to pay the bills, and no insurance company will cover the costs.
A recent survey of the American Hospital Association records showed: 1) the amount of free
care rendered by hospitals in dollar amounts rose from approximately 36 % in 1986 to 64% in 1990;
2) in 1990 hospitals lost 6% of their overall gross patient revenues to uncompensated care charges.
David Burda, Charity Care: Are Hospitals Giving Their FairShare?; MisleadingData, Disparities
In Definitions Muddy The Debate Over How Much Carity Care Is Provided And How Much Is
Enough, MOD. HEALTHCARE, June 15, 1992, at 22.
20. Chandler v. Hospital Auth. of Huntsville, 548 So.2d 1384 (Ala. 1989) (holding that
although a hospital has no affirmative duty to treat patients in emergency conditions, once a hospital
begins to render assistance it is liable to provide care); Harper v. Baptist Medical Ctr.-Princeton,
341 So.2d 133, 134 (Ala. 1976) (holding that the hospital owed no duty of care to a person who has
not already been accepted as a patient); Citizens Hosp. Ass'n v. Schoulin, 262 So.2d 303 (Ala.
App. 1972) (finding that a hospital has no duty to treat a patient it finds to be unacceptable).
21. See, e.g., Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135, 140 (Del. 1961). Courts
found this implied duty based on the fact that if a person relied on the hospital's custom of providing
care their condition may be worsened in the futile attempt to obtain care at the hospital. Id. at 138.
22. Johnson v. University of Chicago Hosp., 982 F.2d 230, 232 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that
under Illinois law a hospital telemetry system operator who voluntarily assumed responsibilities
could be held liable if such duties were performed negligently). The case was remanded for further
findings of fact. Id.
23. The Public Health Service Construction and Modernization of Hospitals and Other Medical
Facilities Grants and Loans for Construction and Modernization of Hospital and Other Medical
Facilities, 42 U.S.C.S. § 291 (West Supp. 1992).
24. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Women in Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §
1395dd (West Supp. 1992).
25. See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Hill-Burton Act; see
infra notes 160-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of EMTALA.
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requiring medical facilities to render emergency care.' The main problems
with the state enactments are the lack of clear definitions of essential terms and
the absence of a specific remedy under state law.'
Hospitals render $300 million in uncompensated medical care each year.'
The legal response to patient dumping must provide all Americans with
emergency health care." Such care must be rendered without driving hospitals
out of business, because such an effect would result in less emergency care
being available.'
Regulations on patient dumping must strike a balance
between the necessity of emergency medical care and the cost containment

26. Approximately 21 states have enacted legislation to prohibit patient dumping. See infra note
207 and accompanying text for a discussion of the state statutes.
27. See infra notes 207-33 and accompanying text. See also Karen I. Treiger, Preventing
Patient Dumping: Sharpening the Cobra's Fangs, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1186, 1202 (1989)
(concluding that state statutes are weak and lack definitions of emergency services, adequate
remedies, and enforcement procedures).
28. H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 42
U.S.C.C.A.N. 748. Emergency physicians are a medical speciality and 15,000 emergency room
physicians treat more than 77 million emergency patients each year. Id. at 741.
29. The House report stated:
Inappropriate and unlawful transfers of patients from one hospital to another often have
tragic consequences. They cause unnecessary suffering- physical and mental anguish,
humiliation, and loss of life and limb. In some instances, babies have died who would
have lived had medical treatment not been delayed because of a transfer. Access to
adequate health care is a basic necessity of life that should be available to every
American regardless of their economic status.
EQUAL ACCESS, supra note 2, at 20.
30. Critics of patient dumping legislation allege that the ultimate result of such legislation will
be a net reduction in the emergency care available to the indigent because such statutes cause
emergency room closures. Mark A. Hall, The Unlikely Case in Favor of Patient Dumping, 28
JuuMaETRics J. 389, 394 (1988). Critics further allege that if patient dumping laws are successful
at all it is only to the point of postponing the dumping of patients to the point in time when the
patients are stabilized. The patient dumping laws do not require all emergency treatments, only
those that are necessary to stabilize, and this only touches the surface of the problem. Id. at 393.
The recent case of Powers v. Arlington Hosp., 800 F. Supp. 1384 (E.D. Va. 1992), illustrates
the problem of patient dumping fines being so high that hospitals may be forced to close their doors.
In Powers, the plaintiff was discharged from the emergency room of Arlington Hospital after a two
hour examination. The hospital discovered that the plaintiff was uninsured and unemployed. The
hospital ordered tests, but discharged the plaintiff before the results were reported. The plaintiff
returned to the hospital the next day, and it was determined that she was suffering from septic shock.
The plaintiff was hospitalized for four Months, had both of her legs amputated and lost the sight in
her eyes. Id.
The plaintiff filed both a malpractice claim and a claim under EMTALA for patient dumping.
Virginia has a one million dollar cap on malpractice damages. Powers was able to collect four
million dollars in damages under her patient dumping claim. Id.
These types of damages encourage plaintiffs to use the patient dumping statute as a method
of recovering more monetary damages than they can collect under a malpractice claim, instead of
deterring patient dumping which is the purpose of the law. Further, such high damage awards will
result in the closure of hospitals and ultimately a lower availability of medical care.
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problems that medical facilities face."
This Note examines both the federal response to the patient dumping
problem and state attempts to solve the problem through case law and statutory
enactments. More specifically, Section II of this Note discusses the federal
response to patient dumping implemented by the Hill-Burton Act and EMTALA.
Section II discusses the federal laws' failure to prevent patient dumping. Next,
Section m analyzes the judicial interpretations of EMTALA. Section III also
focuses on legal issues that are unclear from EMTALA's plain language and the
inconsistent approach that the courts have taken in filling in the gaps of
EMTALA's language.
Furthermore, Section IV discusses the interaction between the federal
patient dumping laws and state medical malpractice laws.
Section IV
emphasizes that a claim for personal harm damages under patient dumping
should not create a national medical malpractice cause of action. Next, Section
V discusses the state regulations on patient dumping. The analysis of the state
regulations on patient dumping includes statutory enactments and a discussion
of common law cases. Finally, Section VI concludes this Note by proposing
model legislation for Indiana to adopt to attack the patient dumping problem.
The proposed legislation defines specific terms and directly addresses the
conflict between the federal patient dumping laws and state medical malpractice
claims.

31. "True cost containment depends on controlling the costs of the health care system as a
whole, without impairing quality." Eli Ginzberg, A Hard Look at Cost Containment, 316 NEW
ENO. J. MED. 1151, 1152 (1987). Critics of cost containment argue that such provisions lead to
fewer medical services, and that people will correctly perceive medical services to be declining in
quality. Victor R. Fuchs, The Counterrevolutionin Health CareFinancing,316 NEwENG. J. MED.

1154, 1155 (1987).
Some health care experts say that cost containment problems in health care have arisen because
of new medical technology and the increase of the United States population. In particular, the
elderly population has increased and therefore health care costs have also increased. Kenneth A.
Kovach, Health Care Cost Containment: An Impossible Dream? 42 LAB. L.J. 660, 661 (1991).
Some hospitals admit that cost shifting will continue to occur, "When you buy a shirt, you pay
for all the shirts that have been shoplifted. Similarly, when you get a broken arm treated, you pay
for the treatment of all uninsured patients' broken arms." Carolyn Hirschman, Charity Care
Burdens Hospitals, BUSINESS FIRST-COLUMBUS, August 19, 1991, at 1.
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II. THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO PATIENT DUMPING

A.

The Hill-Burton Act

In 1946 Congress passed the Hill-Burton Act.' The Hill-Burton Act was
passed in part as a response to President Truman's message to Congress, which
called for financial barriers to be removed from the attainment of health care."
One of the Hill-Burton Act's primary goals was to provide a reasonable amount
of free or reduced cost medical care for the indigent?' Under the Hill-Burton

32. Hospital Survey and Construction (Hill-Burton Act), 42 U.S.C.S. § 291 (West Supp. 1992).
The Hill-Burton Act states, in relevant part:
The State shall provide for adequate hospitals, and other facilities for which aid under
this statute is available, for all persons residing in the State, and adequate hospitals (and
other such facilities) to furnish needed services for persons unable to pay therefor. Such
regulations may also require that before approval of an application for a project is
recommended by a State agency to the Surgeon General for approval under this part,
assurance shall be received by the State from the applicant that: 1) the facility or
portion thereof to be constructed or modernized will be made available to all persons
residing in the territorial area of the applicant; and 2) there will be made available
in the facility or portion thereof to be constructed or modernized a reasonable volume
of services to persons unable to pay thereof, but an exception shall be made if such a
requirement is not feasible from a financial viewpoint.
Id.
33. President Truman's Message to Congress on Health Legislation, 1945 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1143.
President Truman stated, "Millions of our citizens do not now have a full measure of opportunity
to achieve and enjoy good health. Millions do not now have protection or security against the
economic effects of sickness. The time has arrived for action to help them attain that opportunity
and that protection." Id.
34. Hearings Before the Comm. on Educ. and Labor on S. 191, U.S. Senate, 79th Congress,
1st Sess., March 12, 1945, at pp. 190-91. Senator Ellender indicated that a primary reason for
supporting a federal bill that gives aid to hospitals was to allow the hospitals to aid indigents in need
of health care. Id.
Another legislative goal of the Hill-Burton Act was to increase the amount of medical facilities
and to improve already existing facilities. H.R. REP. No. 2519, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1946),
reprintedin 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1558. The bill stated:
Basic Purpose:
1. To help the States survey all existing hospitals and public health centers and
determine their adequacy, to afford the facilities necessary for adequate service to all
the people of the State, and plan State-wide construction programs of the facilities
needed, in conjunction with the existing facilities, to supply such service, and,
2. To assist in the construction of needed facilities for public and other nonprofit
hospitals and for public health centers which are in conformity with the approved State
construction program and the standards for construction projects required under this
bill.
Id.
While this indicates concern for the physical premises of medical facilities, the legislature's
concern was also directed to the provision of health care to the indigent. The Senate report stated:
It is not uncommon for hospitals to close departments or phase out services which are
in and of themselves unprofitable, even though the facility's overall financial health
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Act, medical facilities'
receive federal funds for construction36 or
modernization 7 of their facilities. In exchange, medical facilities must provide
free or reduced medical care for the indigent.'
From 1947 to 1974, $4.4
billion in Hill-Burton funds were appropriated to medical facilities.39 In the
last thirteen years, more than $2.5 billion in charity medical care have been
provided by hospitals that received Hill-Burton funds.' °
A medical facility that receives Hill-Burton funding is presumed to be in
compliance with the Act if it provides: 1) uncompensated health care in the
amount of at least three percent of the overall operating costs of the medical
facility, or ten percent of the amount of the federal funds the facility has
received under the Hill-Burton Act, 41 or 2) the facility certifies that it will not
exclude any person from admission to its facility based on the person's inability
to pay for the services, and that it will provide care for patients at a reasonable
cost.42 In addition, all facilities that receive Hill-Burton funds must make the
facility or the portion of the facility that is being constructed or modernized

may be sound. These closures or phaseouts can be particularly devastating to the poor
if, as is often the case, the clinics or departments involved are the source of scarce
emergency room or outpatient services.
S. REP. No. 96, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1306, 1396. The
report further stated, "The committee intends that the guidelines for the disbursement of the
incentive payments should assure that the facilities and clinics on which the poor and minorities rely
for inpatient and outpatient care are not discontinued." Id.
35. The term "medical facilities' includes hospitals, laboratories, outpatient departments,
nursing home facilities, extended care facilities, self-care units, education or training facilities for
medical personnel, public health centers, and rehabilitation facilities. 42 U.S.C.S. § 291o(4)(c)-(g)
(1992).
36. The term "construction" incorporates 'construction of new buildings, expansion,
remodeling, and alteration of existing buildings, and initial equipment of such buildings including
architect fees." Id. § 291o(4)(i).
37. The term "modernization" incorporates, "alteration, major repaii, remodeling, replacement,
renovation of existing buildings (including initial equipment thereof), and replacement of obsolete,
built-in equipment of existing buildings." Id. § 291o(4)(k).
38. 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(d) (1992). These requirements for compliance are commonly known
as, 'the community service assurance and the reasonable volume of uncompensated care assurance."
American Hosp. Ass'n v. Scweiker, 721 F.2d 170, 172 (7th Cir. 1983).
39. S. REP. No. 1285, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7860.
The following appropriations (in millions of dollars) were made to medical facilities under the HillBurton Act: 1948- $75.0, 1949- $75.0, 1959- $150.0, 1951- $85.0, 1952- $82.5, 1953- $75.0,
1954- $65.0, 1955- $96.0, 1956- $109.8, 1957- $123.8, 1958- $120.0, 1959- $185.0, 1960- $185.0,
1961- $185.0, 1962- $209.7, 1963- $220.0, 1964- $220.0, 1965- $220.0, 1966- $258.5, 1967$270.0, 1968- $267.2, 1969- $267.2, 1970- $172.2, 1971- $172.7, 1972- $197.2, 1973- $197.2,
1974- $197.2. Id. at 7861.
40. Burda, supra note 19, at 22.
41. 42 U.S.C.S. § 291c(e)(1) (West Supp. 1992); 42 C.F.R. 53.111(d)(1) (West Supp. 1992).
42. 42 U.S.C.S. § 291c(e)(2) (West Supp. 1992); 42 C.F.R. § 53.111 (d)(2) (West Supp. 1992).
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available to all people in the immediate area.'
These requirements for providing care only apply to medical facilities that
receive federal Hill-Burton funds." Furthermore, even facilities that receive
federal funds are not required to provide services from their entire facilities.'
The medical facilities are only required to provide services that constitute a
reasonable volume 4 of medical care in light of the amount of federal funds
they have received, and given the nature of their particular community needs.47
Medical facilities that receive Hill-Burton funds must render the required aid to
the indigent for twenty years.'
The Hill-Burton Act requires facilities that receive federal funds for
construction or modernization of the medical facilities to post a notice of their
obligation to provide care to the indigent.49 The notice must be posted in the
admissions office, the emergency department, and the business office. 50 In
addition, the facilities must post the dollar limit in uncompensated services they
must provide under the Hill-Burton Act and the volume of such services that
have already been provided."1
One early recognized flaw of the Hill-Burton Act was that the requirement
that a medical facility provide free services to the indigent was not actually
enforced from 1946, when the statute was enacted, until 1972, when the first
enforcement procedures were created. 2 The enforcement procedures consist

43. 42 U.S.C.S. § 291(c)(e)(1) (West Supp. 1992).
44. Gordon v. Forsyth County Hosp. Auth., 409 F. Supp. 708, 721 (M.D.N.C. 1976), affid
in part and vacated on other grounds, 544 F.2d 748 (4th Cir. 1976).
45. Id.
46. A reasonable volume of medical care is defined as, "a level of uncompensated services
which meets a need for such services in the area served by an applicant and which is within the
financial ability of such applicant to provide." 42 C.F.R. 53.11 (b)(7) (West Supp. 1992).
47. Gordon, 409 F. Supp. 708, 720 (M.D.N.C. 1976). The court found that if all aspects of
a medical complex that received federal funds under the Hill-Burton Act were required to render free
health care to the indigent, the result would be an unjustified and undue burden on the medical
facility receiving the federal funding. Id.
48. 42 C.F.R. 53.111(a) (West Supp. 1992).
49. Id. at 53.11 1(i). The notice states, "This hospital (or other facility) is required by law to
give a reasonable amount of service at no cost or less than full cost to people who cannot pay. If
you think that you are eligible for these services, please contact our business office (give office
location) and ask for assistance. If you are not satisfied with the results, you may contact (the State
Hill-Burton agency with address)."
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Newsomv. Vanderbilt Univ., 453 F. Supp. 401,409 (M.D. Tenn. 1978), aff'd in part and
modified in part, rev'd inpart, 653 F.2d 1100 (6th Cir. 1981). Further, the enforcement regulations
were enacted as a result of private lawsuits that were brought, not any independent actions of the
legislature or administrative agencies. Id. The lack of enforcement procedures for this twenty-five
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of state agencies evaluating and enforcing vague provisions established by the
Department of Health and Human Services. 3 The enforcement provisions
require facilities that apply for Hill-Burton funds to submit an assurance that
they will comply with the community service requirements of the Act.' The
state agency reviews these assurances before they approve an application for
Hill-Burton funds.' The state agency then annually evaluates compliance with
the assurance by the facility.' In addition, the state agency is required to set
procedures to deal with complaints alleging that the facility has not met its
obligations.57
The enforcement provisions suggested included license
revocation, termination of state assistance, and court actions.' Moreover, the
enforcement provisions were created as a response to private lawsuits alleging
that facilities were not complying with the Hill-Burton requirements."
These enforcement provisions leave the specific methods of enforcement to
the individual state agencies that are established. ' The Department of Health
and Human Services is involved to the extent that it approves a state plan, and
it receives state reports of legal action involved when a medical facility does not
comply with the community service assurance. 6 '
The failure of these
enforcement provisions to state in the statute what steps will be taken if
compliance is not met is an essential flaw in the attempt to deter facilities from

year period caused problems for courts in determining when the period of regulated activity and free
medical care is measured. Prior to the enactment of the 1972 enforcement procedures, medical
facilities were not on notice of the threatened enforcements which would be rendered against them
if they violated their duty to provide health care to the indigent in exchange for federal Hill-Burton
funds. Practical considerations also became an issue because prior to 1972 there was no requirement
that records be kept of the free Hill-Burton health care provided. Id. at 410.
53. 42 C.F.R. § 53.111 (West Supp. 1992).
54. Id. § 53.111(c)(1)(West Supp. 1992).
55. Id.

56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. § 53.111(2) (West Supp. 1992).
59. Id. § 53.113(t) (West Supp. 1992). Critics of administrative agencies allege that Congress
delegates authority on issues to administrative agencies with vague statutory standards. The agencies

then become vulnerable to the pressures exerted by the private groups the legislation sought to
control. James 0.Freedman, Crisis &Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27 STAN. L. REv.
1041, 1054-1055 (1975).
See also Rande E. Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform and Administrative Law: A Structural
Approach, 88 YALE L.J. 243, 250 (1978) ("The task of developing an operational program of
financial inducement and regulatory control is then delegated with little legislative guidance to
federal and state agencies, where the crucial policy and enforcement decisions have much less public
visibility than the original legislation. At the administrative stage, organized provider interests are
better than unorganized consumers to extract tangible benefits and to shape the programs to their
own ends.").
60. 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(1) (West Supp. 1992).
61. Id.
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refusing to render the required care. If a facility is not aware of the
ramifications of noncompliance at the time it accepts the Hill-Burton funds, it
is not likely to be deterred from refusing care based on those penalties. The
lack of enforcement of the Hill-Burton Act has led to a failure of Congress' goal
in providing adequate health care to the indigent.'
Another problem with the Hill-Burton Act is that the only remedy an
indigent plaintiff has, if a medical facility fails to provide care, is to sue for the
The statute itself does not
free care to which the plaintiff was entitled.'
expressly give a right to patients who are denied care to sue the medical facility,
With
but cases interpreting the statute have held that such a right exists."
health care costs so high, medical facilities must have more of a deterrent effect
imposed upon them than the ability of a patient to sue for health care that was
denied to them.6
In reality, a patient who sues for health care under the Hill-Burton Act does
not break even. The Hill-Burton Act does not permit an award of attorneys fees
to plaintiffs that are successful in their suits to obtain medical care to which the

62. S. REP. No. 1285, 93d Cong., 2d Seas. 61 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7860,
7900. The Senate Report stated:
While the State plans reviewed contained provisions which essentially met the Federal
requirements, none of the State agencies had an active program for monitoring
compliance with the requirement. Most intend to rely on complaints to monitor
compliance. Also, some facilities have not informed the State agencies how they intend
to meet the reasonable volume of free services requirement. This seems to the
Committee to be a sorry performance by the Department and the State Hill-Burton
agencies in implementing a provision which has been in law for over 20 years, and
which has recently been reemphasized.
Id.
63. Rapides Gen. Hosp. v. Matthews, 435 F. Supp. 384, 387 (W.D. La. 1977) (holding that
the Hill-Burton Act mandates that facilities receiving funds allocate a certain amount of care to the
indigent, and failure to meet this obligation vests a cause of action in the intended beneficiaries to
sue for the free care that was supposed to be furnished to them).
64. Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115, 1118 (10th Cir. 1972) (concluding that allowing a
private cause of action under the Hill-Burton Act would promote the public interest and would bring
about the proper enforcement procedures of the Hill-Burton Act); Organized Migrants in Community
Action, Inc. v. James Archer Smith Hoap., 325 F. Supp. 268, 271 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (denying the
defendant's motion to dismiss and holding that the plaintiffs had standing to bring suit on their own
behalf under the Hill-Burton Act); Cook v. Ochaner Found. Hosp., 319 F. Supp. 603, 606 (E.D.
La. 1970) ("It is a matter of the clearest logic that the only real beneficiaries of a hospital program
are the people who need or may need medical treatment. This includes people of all classes,
whether rich or poor."). The court concluded that the right to bring a private cause of action was
implied under the Hill-Burton Act. Id.
65. Karen I. Treiger, PreventingPatientDumping: Sharpeningthe Cobra'sFangs, 61 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1186, 1199-1200 (1986). "There is little incentive for hospital compliance with or HHS
enforcement of Hill-Burton, neither the statute nor the regulations provide punitive measures for
violations. Without fear of punishment, hospitals feel free to disregard their obligations." Id.
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law entitles them. Thus, patients must pay legal fees to determine whether they
were entitled to Hill-Burton care. The remedy that may be obtained will not
compensate the patients for these fees; it will only compensate them for the care
that they were denied.' In addition, indigent patients certainly do not have the
resources to pay the necessary legal fees for the determination that they were
denied a right to health care. Attorneys would be more likely to represent
indigent plaintiffs on patient dumping claims if the patient dumping statute
provided for attorneys fees.
Given this situation, patient dumping laws should include a provision that
requires attorneys fees to be paid by the defendant if there is a finding that a
patient's right to medical care was improperly denied.'c Furthermore, patient
dumping laws must pose a greater threat to medical facilities than the threat of
forcing the medical facility to render care it is already obligated to provide. The
law must provide for a serious remedy against medical facilities to provide an
adequate deterrent effect, without forcing the facilities out of business.'
Another area of the Hill-Burton Act that poses a problem is that once a
medical facility has met its quota of three percent of the overall operation costs,
or ten percent of their Hill-Burton federal loans, there is no longer any duty on
the part of the medical facility to provide health care to indigent patients. 69
Even the medical facilities that received the $4.4 billion in grants and $2 billion
in loans through the Hill-Burton Act from 1947 to 1974 did not provide the care
for the indigent that was expected of them in exchange for the loans and
grants.70
A 1980 study conducted in North Dakota concluded that out of twenty-one
surveyed facilities that received Hill-Burton funds, twenty of the facilities were

66. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
67. The House Report for EMTALA proposed that attorneys fees should be provided in the
patient dumping statute. The report stated:
The subcommittee review found that private attorneys would most likely be reluctant
to bring suit to enforce the statute, unless the patient has been severely harmed by the

illegal transfer, because their expenses and fees might not be paid. But the preventive
effect of the statute is diluted if only those cases which command a large damage award

are brought. The award of attorneys fees in successful private suits to enforce the
COBRA amendment would correct this problem. As Judith Waxman, attorney for the

National Health Law Center pointed out, if HHS is not enforcing the statute and if
private lawyers won't bring cases, the law will become meaningless.

EQUAL ACCess, supra note 2, at 19. Despite this proposal, EMTALA did not include a provision
for attorneys fees. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd (West Supp. 1992).
68. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
69. Wyoming Hosp. Ass'n v. Harris, 727 F.2d 936, 939 (10th Cir. 1984).
70. S. REP. No. 1285 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7860.
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required to provide a total of $63,487 in extra free medical care.71 In addition,
fourteen out of the twenty-one facilities analyzed in the survey did not meet the
amount of free care they were obliged to provide under the Act. 2 The HillBurton Act has merely put a dent in the enormous problem of patient dumping
and lacks the clear terms and aggressive enforcement procedures that are needed
to effectively eliminate patient dumping and provide adequate health care for the
indigent.' Faced with these deficiencies, Congress made a second attempt to
regulate patient dumping by enacting EMTALA.
B. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Women in Active Labor Act
The most recent federal attempt to solve the patient dumping problem is the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Women in Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 74
which was passed in 1986. EMTALA applies to all medical facilities that
receive Medicaid benefits and hospitals that maintain emergency rooms.'
Ninety-one percent of the hospitals in the United States receive Medicaid
benefits.7 6 EMTALA was passed in response to the growing concern that
patients in need of emergency medical services were being denied care.' In
addition, it was found that a large number of patients being denied emergency
care were the indigent and the uninsured.' The federal response to the patient
dumping problem was intended to enact penalties to prevent patient dumping.'
In addition, the federal laws were intended to ensure that such penalties were not

71. Kevin O'Neil, Site isits at 21 Hill-Burton FacilitiesReveal Extensive Noncompliance, 16
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 404, 407 (1985). The study further showed that of twenty-one facilities
reviewed: 1) 7 out of 21 facilities did not provide the individual notice required under the HillBurton enforcement procedures; 2) 11 out of the 21 facilities did not have accurate written notices,
and the notices used contained specific language that would tend to cause an applicant to believe that
they were not eligible for the free care required under the Act; 3) 5 out of the 21 did not determine
eligibility and amounts of care they were required to provide accurately; 4) 9 out of the 21 facilities
used accounts for their Hill-Burton requirements that were not properly part of the care required
under Hill-Burton; and 5) 15 out of 21 facilities did not have Hill-Burton records that are required
to be kept, and those that did maintain records did not have complete reports. Id.
72. Id. at 411.
73. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
74. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd (West Supp. 1992). For a discussion of EMTALA and amendments
that should be created, see Thomas L. Stricter Jr., Note, The Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active LaborAct: Denial of EmergencyMedical Care Because of ImproperEconomic Motives, 67
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1121 (1992); Andrew J. McClurg, Your Money or Your Life: Interpreting
the FederalActAgainst Patient Dumping, 24 WAKE FOREsT L. REv. 174 (1989); Karen I. Treiger,
PreventingPatientDumping: Sharpening the Cobra's Fang's,61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1186 (1989).
75. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd (West Supp. 1992).
76. Danielle L. Trostorff, King Cobra Recoils, 37 FEB. B. NEWS & J. 442 (1990).
77. H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt 3, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 42, 726.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 728.
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so severe that hospitals would choose to close down instead of risking the fines
and sanctions under EMTALA.s'
EMTALA is a more successful attempt to solve the patient dumping
problem than the Hill-Burton Act. EMTALA defines the essential terms
necessary to determine if required care to indigent patients was properly
provided."' Furthermore, EMTALA applies to almost all situations in which
a patient in an emergency medical condition is dumped.'
Under the HillBurton Act, if an indigent patient with an emergency medical condition is
unlucky enough to arrive at the hospital the day after the facility fulfilled its
Hill-Burton requirements, the patient is out of luck because the facility no longer
has any duty to provide care to the indigent.' Moreover, even if a medical
facility is still under the obligations of the Hill-Burton Act, if the patient needing
care is in an area of the facility that is not part of the Hill-Burton funds, the
facility is under no obligation to render care.' EMTALA also provides for
remedies directly in the statute, whereas the Hill-Burton Act relies on judicial
interpretations to hold that a private cause of action could be brought against a
medical facilityY
EMTALA prohibits the dumping of a patient either when the patient is in
an emergency medical condition or when a woman is in active labor." Once
a hospital has stabilized a patient it is free to transfer the patient even if the
reasons for the transfer are economic.' An emergency medical condition is
defined as a condition that could place the patient's health in serious jeopardy,
result in serious impairment to bodily functions, or serious dysfunction to bodily
organs.'
A pregnant woman's condition is deemed to be an emergency

80. Id. The legislative history states, "Thus, the committee is concerned that if penalties are
too severe, some hospitals, particularly those located in rural or poor areas, may decide to close
their emergency rooms entirely rather than risk the civil fines and damage awards." Id.
81. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd (West Supp. 1992).
82. Id. See also infra notes 86-97 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
86. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd(b)(1) (West Supp. 1992).
87. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd (West Supp. 1992).
88. Id. § 1395dd(d)(2)(e)(1)(A). EMTALA states:
(1) The term emergency medical condition means(A) A medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient
severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical
attention could reasonably be expected to result in(i)placing the health of the individual, (or with respect to a
pregnant woman, the health of the woman or her unborn child)
in serious jeopardy,
(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or
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medical condition if there is not enough time to transfer the woman safely before
she delivers the baby, or if the woman's or child's health is threatened by the
transfer. 9
EMTALA also requires a medical facility to give a patient an appropriate
medical screening "within the hospital's capability."' After a medical facility
has rendered emergency care that stabilizes a patient, the facility is permitted to
transfer the patient. 9' EMTALA defines stabilization of a patient as, "such
medical treatment of the condition as may be necessary to assure, within
reasonable medical probability, that no material deterioration of the condition is
likely to result from or occur during the transfer. "'
Medical facilities are also permitted to transfer a patient who is in an
emergency condition and has not been stabilized if the guidelines set forth in the
statute are met.9 One situation in which a transfer is appropriate is when the

(iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part.
Id.
89. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd(d)(2)(e)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1992).
medical emergency means:

EMTALA states the term

(B) with respect to a pregnant woman who is having contractions(i) that there is inadequate time to effect a safe transfer to another hospital
before delivery, or
(ii) that the transfer may pose a threat to the health or safety of the woman
or the unborn child.
Id.
90. Id. § 1395dd(a).
91. Id. § 1395dd(c).
92. Id. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A).
93. Id. § 1395dd(c)(1). EMTALA provides:
(1) If a patient at a hospital with an emergency medical condition which has not been
stabilized the hospital may not transfer the individual unless(A)(i) The individual (or a legally responsible person acting on the
individual's behalf) after being informed of the hospital's obligations under
this section and the risk of transfer, in writing requests transfer to another
medical facility.
(ii) A physician has signed a certification that, based upon the reasonable
risks and benefits to the individual, and based upon the information
available at the time of transfer, the medical benefits reasonably expected
from the provision of appropriate medical treatment to another medical
facility outweigh the increased risks to the individual and, in the case of
labor, to the unborn child from effecting the transfer, or
iii) If a physician is not present a qualified medical person has signed a
certification as described in clause ii.
Id.
In addition, EMTALA specifies guidelines that must be followed even in situations where a
transfer is appropriate:
(2) Appropriate transfer. An appropriate transfer to a medical facility is a transfer(A) In which the transferring hospital provides the medical treatment
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patient or the patient's legal representative requests that a transfer be made.'
In addition, a physician may determine that, based on the risks and benefits
involved, a transfer is in the patient's best interest." If a physician makes this
determination, he or she must sign a certification stating that the transfer is in
the patient's best medical interest."
If a medical facility violates EMTALA by not stabilizing patients before
transferring them or by failing to meet the guidelines for a proper transfer when
patients are in an unstable condition, civil monetary penalties are imposed.'
A hospital or physician that violates EMTALA may incur a monetary penalty
of up to $50,000.' In addition to this civil monetary penalty, a private cause
of action for personal harm may be brought and relief granted under the law of
the state where the hospital is located."

within its capacity which minimizes the risk to the individual's health and,
in the case of a woman in labor, the health of the unborn child;
(B) In which the receiving facility (i)
Has available space and qualified personnel for the
treatment of the individual, and
(ii) Has agreed to accept transfer of the individual and to
provide appropriate medical treatment;
(C) In which the transferring hospital sends to the receiving facility all
medical records (or copies thereof), related to the emergency condition for
which the individual has presented, available at the time of the transfer,
including records related to the individual's emergency medical condition,
observations of signs or symptoms, preliminary diagnosis, treatment
provided, results of any tests and the informed written consent or
certification (or copy thereof) provided under paragraph (1)(A), and the
name and address of any on-call physician who has refused or failed to
appear within a reasonable time to provide necessary stabilizing treatment;
(D) In which the transfer is effected through qualified personnel and
transportation equipment, as required including the use of necessary and
medically appropriate life support measures during the transfer; and
(E) Which meets such other requirements as the Secretary may find
necessary in the interest of the health and safety of individuals transferred.
Id. § 1395dd(c)(2).
94. Id. § 1395dd(c)(1)(A)(i).
95. Id.
96. Id. § 1395dd(c)(A)Cii).
97. Id. § 1395dd(d)(1). The approach of EMTALA can be contrasted with the approach of the
Hill-Burton Act in federal attempts to create medical care for the indigent. Under the Hill-Burton
Act, there were no affirmative penalties to be imposed against a medical facility that refused to
comply with the requirement that it provide charity medical care. EMTALA goes further than the
Hill-Burton Act, though, because it contains clear enforcementprovisions within the regulation itself.
However, EMTALA, like the Hill-Burton Act, is not being enforced aggressively. See infra notes
160-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the enforcement of EMTALA.
98. Id. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B)Cii).
99. Id. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A).
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A medical facility may be relieved of liability under EMTALA if a patient
refuses to consent to treatment and examination by the facility. "r0 In addition,
if a patient, after being informed of the risks and benefits of a transfer, refuses
to consent to such a transfer, the medical facility is deemed to have complied
with giving the patient a proper medical screening.' 0 ' The medical facility
bears the burden of proving that the patient initially requested treatment and then
refused the offered treatment. " The lack of clear terms and definitions in
EMTALA has caused courts to attempt to fill in the gaps of the statute, which
has resulted in inconsistencies in the case law. The next aspect of EMTALA to
be examined is the jurisprudential interpretations that have attempted to fill the
gaps in the federal statute.
Ill. JuDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF EMTALA

A. Recovery of PersonalHarm Damages Against a Physician
Courts have a divided approach as to whether a plaintiff can recover
damages for personal harm against a physician under EMTALA. The specific
language of the statute does not provide for a cause of action for personal harm
against a physician. 11 Because the statute clearly spells out that civil
monetary penalties may be imposed against both the hospital and the
that damages for
physician," ° the plain language of the statute indicates
5
personal harm are not available against a physician."'
Most courts have followed this approach and have denied plaintiffs a cause
Courts that apply this
of action for personal harm against physicians."

100. Id. at 1395dd(b)(2). The hospital is required to take all reasonable steps to obtain written
informed consent of the patient's refusal of treatment.
101. Id. at 1395dd(b)(3).
102. Stevison v. Enid Health Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 710, 713 (10th Cir. 1990) (reversing a jury
verdict where the jury had improperly been instructed that the plaintiff had the burden of proving
that a request for emergency medical treatment was not withdrawn). The court held that once the
plaintiff satisfied the initial burden of showing that a request for treatment was made, the burden
shifted to the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the request made by the
plaintiff was withdrawn. Id.
103. 42 U.S.C.A. 1395dd(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1992).
104. Id. at 1395dd(d)(1).
105. Id.
106. Delaney v. Cade, 756 F. Supp. 1476, 1487 (D. Kan. 1991) (granting the physician's
motion for summary judgment on the EMTALA claim, and stating, "[I]f Congress had intended to
create a private cause of action against thephysician it knew how to do so"), affd in part, rev'd on
othergrounds,986 F.2d 387, 394 (10th Cir. 1993); Baber v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872,
878 (4th Cir. 1992) (upholding a summary judgment for the defendant physicians, and stating, "The
clear language of EMTALA, supported by its legislative history, provides no basis for a patient to
recover personal injury damages from her physician"); Richardson v. Southwest Mississippi
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reasoning limit recovery against the physician to normal medical malpractice
damages."° These courts emphasize that the legislative history of EMTALA
clearly spells out the parties who can bring a lawsuit for patient dumping."l
These courts have held that Congress only intended for the Department of
Health and Human Services to bring a cause of action against physicians."°
Because the clear language of the statute does not allow for a cause of action
against the physician, the courts have been reluctant to second-guess Congress
and allow for a private cause of action against the physician."'
In Sorrells v. Babcock,"' the court stated in dicta that it may be possible
for a private party to bring a cause of action against a physician under
EMTALA." 2 The court emphasized that the legislative history of EMTALA
shows that there is a strong need to hold physicians responsible for the denial
of medical care to patients in emergency medical conditions." 3 The court
found that there was federal subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant doctor
whether the plaintiff was permitted to recover a civil monetary penalty or
whether only the governmental entity could impose such civil fines."'
The
court stated, "It would be a strange situation indeed for an individual to bring
a civil suit so that a governmental entity could recover a monetary penalty. " " 5
The court went on to say, "the court does not see why an individual would
expend the monies and the time necessary in bringing the civil suit when he or
she would not benefit in a favorable outcome. The court cannot fathom that
Congress would have intended such a result."" 6

Regional Medical Ctr., 794 F. Supp. 198 (S.D. Miss. 1992) (holding that EMTALA does not create
a private cause of action against a physician); Jones v. Wake County Hosp. Sys. Inc., 786 F. Supp.
538, 545 (E.D.N.C. 1991) (dismissing the plaintiff's claim against the defendant'physician, and
holding that "[it would be inconsistent with the plain language of the statute to infer a private cause
of action against the physician and the court refuses to do so"); Lavignette v. West Jefferson
Medical Ctr., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, 14966 at *4 (E.D. La. Nov. 7, 1990) (holding that the
plaintiff could not maintain a cause of action for patient dumping against the physician, but that the
plaintiff could obtain relief under the state medical malpractice law).
107. Jones, 786 F. Supp. at 545.
108. Id.
109. Baber, 977 F.2d at 872.
110. Id. at 878.
111. 733 F. Supp. 1189 (N.D. fI1. 1990), summ. judgment granted, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17148 (N.D. Ill. 1992). In this case, the plaintiff brought a cause of action for patient dumping after
being discharged while suffering from severe complications of gastrointestinal bleeding. Summary
judgment was granted because the court found that "the plaintiff failed to show that the delay in
diagnosis proximately caused her injury." Id. at 1194.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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One of the problems in relation to EMTALA is that hospitals cannot control
physicians." 7 One attorney stated, "The fact is that most hospitals function
under the political reality that the physicians call the shots.""'
If the
physicians are in reality calling the shots in the emergency medical care
services, an effective provision against patient dumping must hold the physicians
individually responsible for their actions that lead to patient dumping.
B. Requirement that the PlaintiffActually Arrive in the Emergency Room
Recent cases have attempted to clarify whether arrival by a patient in the
hospital's emergency room is a prerequisite to filing a claim for patient dumping
under EMTALA. 9 The section of EMTALA that explains the required
medical screening requirement specifically states that a hospital has a duty to
screen any individual who comes to the emergency department and requests an
examination or treatment." 2' However, the sections of EMTALA requiring
that the patient's condition be stabilized and forbidding transfers unless the
patient is stable'" do not include any specific language about the individual
arriving at the emergency department."n

117. Terese Hudson, Attorneys Fear Patient Transfer Claims in MedicalMalpractice Cases,
HOSPITALS, April 5, 1991, at 44. Hospitals are described as, "not where the doctor practices
medicine, but the hospital is where medical care is delivered using physician and health care
personnel." Id.
118. Id. The attorney gave the example of one hospital that required all on-call physicians to
assist patients whether they were indigent or not, and the entire medical staff quit. The hospital then
withdrew the requirement. Id.
119. Thornton v. Southwest Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131, 1135 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that
a patient who was admitted to the intensive care unit, then spent time in regular in-patient care,
could bring a cause of action for patient dumping, but finding that the plaintiff was not discharged
while in an emergency medical condition); McIntyre v. Schick, 795 F. Supp. 777, 780 (E.D. Va.
1992) (holding that a patient who did not enter the hospital for treatment through the emergency
room did not fail to state a claim for patient dumping); Loss v. Song, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14812
at *9 (N.D. I11.
Nov. 6, 1990) (holding that where a mother gave birth to a child with a medical
emergency condition, failure of the child to arrive at the hospital emergency room did not preclude
a claim for patient dumping under EMTALA).
120. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd(a) (West 1992). The medical screening requirement states, in
relevant part, "If any individual comes to the emergency department and a request is made on the
individual's behalf for an examination or treatment for a medical condition the hospital must provide
for an appropriate screening examination." Id.
121. Id. § 1395dd(b). This section of EMTALA states, in relevant part, "If any individual
comes to a hospital and the hospital determines that the individual has an emergency medical
condition.. .. " Id. Clearly, this section of EMTALA does not require that the care being rendered
to the patient in an emergency medical condition be in the emergency room. Id.
122. Id. § 1395dd(c). This section of EMTALA also uses the term "hospital" in describing
the duties required under the statute. The specific term "hospital emergency room" is not
mentioned.
123. Id.
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In the recent case of McIntyre v. Schick,"A the plaintiff brought a cause
of action under EMTALA based on patient dumping. After the plaintiff arrived
at the hospital with labor contractions,"u the hospital kept the plaintiff at the
hospital for eleven hours and twenty-five minutes, but she was never formally
admitted."
The plaintiff was then sent home. 27 The plaintiff returned to
the hospital the next day, and was found to be in a serious medical
condition."
The plaintiff gave birth to an anemic baby boy who died a few
days after birth.'" The defendant hospital attempted to bring a motion to
dismiss based on the fact that the plaintiff did not allege in her complaint that
she presented herself to the emergency room."
The court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff had stated
a claim under EMTALA, and that claims could be brought under EMTALA for
patient dumping that occurred in areas of the hospital other than the hospital
emergency room.'
The court emphasized that Congress' purpose in enacting
EMTALA was to provide emergency care to all patients, regardless of in which
section of the hospital the care was rendered.'13 2
Loss v. Song'33 further expanded the scope of EMTALA by holding that
patients need not present themselves to the emergency room to obtain relief
under EMTALA.'" In Loss, the plaintiff was admitted to the defendant

124. 795 F. Supp. 777, 780 (E.D. Va. 1992). The court analyzed the specific language of
EMTALA and concluded that the wording of the statute is inclusive of patients in all areas of the
hospital, not just the hospital emergency room. The court further stated that there was no
requirement that a person present themselves first in the hospital emergency room to be able to bring
a cause of action for patient dumping. Id.
125. Id. at 778.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 795 F. Supp. 777, 778 (E.D. Va. 1992).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 781. The court stated:
Although emergency care often occurs, and almost always invariably begins, in an
emergency room, emergency care does not always stop when a patient is wheeled from
the emergency room into the main hospital. . . . The rationale behind the patient
anti-dumping statute is not based upon the door of the hospital through which the patient
enters, but rather upon the notion of proper medical care for those persons suffering
from medical emergencies, whenever such emergencies occur at a participating hospital.
Indeed, it is a ridiculous distinction, one which places form over substance, to state that
the care a patient receives depends on the door through which the patient walks.
Id. (quoting in part from Thorton v. Southwest Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1990)).
132. Id. at 780.
133. 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14812, at *1 (N.D. 1l. Nov. 6, 1990).
134. Id.
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35
hospital and gave birth to a child who had an emergency medical condition.'
The mother and child were discharged, and the mother alleged that the child was
discharged while in an emergency medical condition that was not properly
stabilized by the hospital."3 The court held that a claim could be brought on
behalf of the child under EMTALA even though the child never went to the
emergency room because the child was not yet born. 3 ' The court found that
when the hospital admitted a pregnant woman, the hospital was in effect also
admitting the child, a separate person not yet born.' s

EMTALA was further expanded in Smith v. Richmond Memorial
Hospital,139 where the court held that a cause of action for patient dumping
could be brought when the patient was first admitted to the hospital and
stabilized, and then allowed to become unstable and transferred while the
unstable condition persisted.Y Smith shows the continuation of the courts'
interpretations that EMTALA does not require that patient dumping take place
at any particular time of treatment or at any particular department of the
hospital. 141

135. Id.
136. Id. at *2.
137. The court did not agree with the defendant's argument that the language in EMTALA
meant to require emergency medical care only in the hospital emergency room. The court stated
that Congress' purpose was to insure that all patients with medical emergencies receive the
appropriate medical care. Id. at *7.
138. Id. at *9.
139. 416 S.E.2d 689, 692 n.140 (Va. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 442 (U.S. 1992).
140. Smith, 416 S.E.2d at 692 (Va. 1992). The court emphasized that patient dumping while
an emergency medical condition exists is not to be tolerated from any aspect of the medical facility.
The court stated:
Patient dumping is not limited to a refusal to provide emergency room treatment. It
occurs, and is equally reprehensible, at any time a hospital determines that a patient's
condition may result in substantial medical costs and the hospital transfers the patient
because it fears it will not be paid for those expenses. Dumping a patient in this manner
is neither related to, nor dependent on, the patient arriving through the emergency
room and never being stabilized.
Id. But see Collins v. DePaul Hosp., 963 F.2d 303, 307 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that it must be
established that the plaintiff went to the hospital's emergency room with an emergency medical
condition); Daniels v. Wills Eye Hosp., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7396 at *6 (E.D. Pa. May 7, 1992)
(stating that a plaintiff suing under EMTALA must allege that he went to the defendant's emergency
room); DeBerry v. Sherman Hosp., 741 F. Supp. 1302, 1305 (N.D. Il. 1990) (stating that a
plaintiff suing under EMTALA must allege, 1) he went to the defendant's emergency room, 2) with
an emergency medical condition, and that the hospital either 3) did not adequately screen him to
determine whether he had such a condition, or 4) discharged or transferred him before the
emergency condition had been stabilized), sutm. judgment granted, 769 F. Supp. 1030 (N.D. Ill.
1991) (finding that "there was no showing by the plaintiffs that the hospital knowingly failed to
conduct an appropriate screening examination under § 1395dd," so a summary judgment was
granted).
141. Id.
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In Johnson v. University of Chicago Hospitals," the court refused to
extend EMTALA beyond the physical premises of the hospital to a hospital's
telemetry operator. 43 Johnson restricted the general line of cases that held
that arrival in the emergency room is not a requirement for a claim to be stated
under EMTALA. M In Johnson, the district court held that the EMTALA
provisions did not apply to a patient who was in an ambulance and was directed
to a hospital by a mobile intensive care system tertiary operator. 45 The
plaintiff claimed that the infant patient was directed to a hospital while in an
unstable condition and that being directed to the hospital where treatment was
rendered was not in the infant's best interest, but in the hospital's best economic
interest. 146
The court of appeals initially found that even though the patient sought care
through the hospital's telemetry and paramedic systems, EMTALA applied to
the case and the plaintiff could bring a cause of action for patient dumping. 47
However, a later court of appeals decision reversed this finding, and held that
the plaintiff could not recover under EMTALA because the plaintiff had never
come to the hospital emergency room, which is a requirement for a recovery
based on EMTALA."4
The court of appeals held that a hospital's telemetry system was separate
and distinct from the hospital's emergency room, and it refused to extend
EMTALA to cover the telemetry system. 49 This decision has created an
opportunity for hospitals to evade causes of action under the patient dumping

142. 982 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1992).
143. Id. at 233. Another example of a woman who never actually presented herself to the
hospital emergency room, yet was within the reach of the hospital if it chose to help her, was Liza
Cruz. Cruz was a 62-year-old woman who was injured when her car overturned. She was 40 feet
from a hospital emergency room, but when witnesses went to the hospital to obtain help, the hospital
stated that the woman would have to wait for an ambulance service to pick her up. Ms. Cruz waited
30 minutes before an ambulance picked her up and delivered her to the nearby hospital. Jo Ann
Zuniga, A Hospital So Close But Yet So Far Away, THE HOUSTON CHRON., December 8, 1992, at
17.
144. See supra notes 119-41 and accompanying text.
145. Johnsonv. Univ. of ChicagoHosp., 774 F. Supp. 510, 513 (N.D. Ill. 1991), affd inpart,
rev'd inpart 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 25096 (7th Cir. Oct. 7, 1992), vacated 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
31109 (7th Cir. Nov. 23, 1992), affid in part, rev'd in part 982 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1992).
146. Id.
147. Johnson, U.S. App. LEXIS 25096 at *11 (7th Cir. Oct. 7, 1992) ("Although the Act
refers to individuals who come to the hospital, we agree with Ms. Johnson's assertion that an
individual can seek medical assistance from a hospital through telemetry communications and
paramedic services without coming to the hospital's emergency room.").
148. Johnson, 982 F.2d 230, 233 (7th Cir. 1992). The court did state, "Although a hospital
could conceivably use a telemetry system in a scheme to dump patients, the statute does not
expressly address the question of liability in such a situation." Id. at 233 n.7.
149. Id.
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laws. Under the Johnson decision, if a hospital can prevent a patient from ever
getting to the emergency room, the hospital can effectively avoid treating the
patient without being liable for patient dumping. This situation directly conflicts
with previous cases holding that arrival or presence in the hospital emergency
room is not a requirement for a claim of patient dumping and is the type of
situation the courts sought to prevent."5 Under the approach in Johnson, the
more effectively the hospital prevents the availability of emergency care so that
patients never get close to the emergency room, the more likely it is the hospital
will be able to avoid the patient dumping laws.
C. Requirement that Indigency be Alleged by the Plaintiff
The issue of whether an allegation of indigency is required for a claim
under EMTALA is another area where courts are split in their interpretations.
Some courts have held that a plaintiff must base a claim for patient dumping on

the fact that the patient was denied treatment because of economic motives of
the medical facility, 5 Courts that take this approach reason that if indigency
is not an element required for a patient dumping claim, then any patient who is
not satisfied with the medical treatment they are given could bring a cause of
action under EMTALA, and this would be extending the federal statute further
than necessary. 152
Other courts have held that EMTALA protects any person who is denied

150. See supra notes 119-41 and accompanying text.
151. Coleman v. McCurtain Memorial Medical Management, 771 F. Supp. 343, 347 (E.D.
Okla. 1991) (finding the plaintiff's claim to be one of misdiagnosis, not a claim for patient
dumping); Stewart v. Myrick, 731 F. Supp. 433, 436 (D. Kan. 1990) (finding that this case does
not "represent a case of patient dumping, in which the plaintiff was turned away from medical care
for economic reasons. As a result, the case does not present the type of evil that Congress sought
to eliminate in the Act, and the federal claim will be dismissed."); Nichols v. Eastabrook, 741 F.
Supp. 325, 330 (D.N.H. 1989). The court held that the legislative history of EMTALA "reveals
the Congressional intent behind the Act: to provide some assurance that patients with emergency
medical conditions will be examined and treated regardless of their financial resources. Plaintiffs
here do not allege that their financial condition or lack of health insurance contributed to Dr.
Eastabrook's decision not to treat their son. The interest which Congress sought to protect by
enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd was not invaded by the defendant's conduct as here alleged . .. ."
Id. See also Evitt v. University Heights Hosp., 727 F. Supp. 495, 497 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (finding
that where plaintiff alleged that her medical condition was misdiagnosed, but her inaccurate treatment
was not based on indigency, the cause of action was for medical malpractice, not patient dumping
under EMTALA).
152. Evia, 727 F. Supp. at 497. Courts reason further that patients will be adequately
compensated for an improper or inappropriate medical screening by bringing a state medical
malpractice claim. Id.
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emergency treatment.regardless if the person is indigent.'
These courts base
such a holding on the plain language of EMTALA, which states that "any
individual" may bring a patient dumping suit if that individual is denied
treatment."
The courts further reason that there is no requirement that a
plaintiff be indigent to recover under the statute.'
Given the nature of the
patient dumping problem, adding the requirement that a plaintiff allege indigency
would create unnecessary hurdles for plaintiffs, and would lessen the deterrent
effect of the patient dumping statute. Hospitals may dump patients who appear
to be uninsured and unable to pay for the services, but in fact those patients may
be able to pay or they may have health insurance that will cover the services.
Such cases would be no less serious than a hospital dumping a patient who is in
fact indigent, and these cases should be treated no differently under the law.
D. Failure of EMTALA in Preventing PatientDumping
Another problem with EMTALA is that it does not apply when a hospital
misdiagnoses or fails to diagnose an emergency condition." If no emergency
condition is found by the hospital, then no cause of action is available based on

153. Collins v. DePaul Hosp., 963 F.2d 303, 308 (10th Cir. 1992); Brooker v. Desert Hosp.,
947 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1991); Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, 917 F.2d 266, 270 (6th
Cir. 1990); Urban v. King, 783 F. Supp. 560, 562 (Kan. 1992); Burrows v. Turner Memorial
Hosp., 762 F. Supp. 840, 842 (W.D. Ark. 1991); Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933
F.2d 1037, 1040 (D.O.C. 1991).
The court in Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group stated:
We can think of many reasons other than indigency that might lead a hospital to give
less than standard attention to a person who arrives at the emergency room. These
might include: prejudice against the race, sex, or ethnic group of the patient; distaste
for the patient's condition (e.g., AIDS patients); personal dislike or antagonism between
the medical personnel and the patient; disapproval of the patient's occupation; or
political or cultural opposition. If a hospital refused treatment to persons for any of
these reasons, or gave cursory treatment, the evil inflicted would be quite akin to that
discussed by Congress in the legislative history of EMTALA, and the patient would fall
squarely within the statutory language.
Cleland, 917 F.2d at 272.
For a detailed discussion of discrimination in health care against AIDS patients, see Joseph
Reiner, Aids DiscriminationBy Medical Care Providers: Is Washington Law An Adequate Remedy?
63 WASH. L. Rv. 701 (1988).
154. Cleland, 917 F.2d at 272.
155. Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1040. While the court found no need for indigency to be alleged,
it did require that a screening process be done in a manner which evidences differential treatment
of the patient. However, the court stated that it did not require an improper motive on the part of
the hospital, only that the screening that was done was improper. The couit held that if a case
involved a misdiagnosis or failure to diagnose a problem, the case should be resolved based on
medical malpractice law. Id. at 1041.
156. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd(b)(1) (West 1992). The specific language of the statute describes
the necessary duties of the hospital in light of the fact that it has been established that the patient is
suffering from an emergency medical condition. Id.
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patient dumping.' 57 The court in Mitchell v. Candlers stated in dicta that
this creates a loophole in EMTALA: because hospitals can shield themselves
from liability by falsely diagnosing a condition as non-emergency, the hospital's
duty to stabilize does not arise until an emergency condition has been
established.'59 Under this analysis, a hospital itself can set a very low
standard of care for determining emergency conditions. Patients should be
permitted to bring patient dumping claims, and a judge or jury, not the hospital
or doctors, should apply objective standards and determine if under the
circumstances the patient was in an emergency condition.
In enforcement and application, EMTALA has enjoyed little success. Since
EMTALA's enactment in 1986, 149 hospitals were found to have violated
EMTALA.'6 Only thirteen of these hospitals have been penalized for their
violations of EMTALA.'6 ' The total amount of fines these hospitals paid was
$479,500.162 There were 121 hospitals in violation of EMTALA that were
never punished." 6 In light of the statistics that 250,000 patients are being
dumped each year,'" EMTALA appears to have had little impact on the
problem of patient dumping.
Sixty-seven of the 149 EMTALA violations identified and investigated were
in Texas.' 5 The spokesperson for the Health Care Financing Administration'" stated that the difference in the regions could be attributed to the
existence of Texas' patient dumping statute."6 The small number of patient
dumping cases filed under EMTALA is attributed to the fact that most people

157. Mitchell v. Candler General Hosp., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5997 at *14 (S.D. Ga. April
2, 1992). The court stated, "The plain language of the Act, however, makes it apparent that the
hospital's duty to stabilize does not arise until the hospital recognizes and diagnoses an emergency
medical condition.- Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at *18.
160. Lynn Wagner, Group Says Government is Lax in Enforcing Patient-Dumping Law, MOD.
HEALTHCARB, April 29, 1991, at 18. Most of the hospitals evaluated had violated the provision
against illegal transfers. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. In addition, three of the hospitals found to be in violation of EMTALA were
temporarily barred from participation in Medicaid, and three hospitals were permanently removed
from the Medicaid program.
163. Id.
164. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
165. Wagner, supra note 160, at 18.
166. The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) "has primary responsibility for
enforcing [the antidumping law], and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) is responsible for
applying certain sanctions under the statute." EQUAL ACCES,, supra note 2, at 2.
167. See Health Care, Public Citizen Calls HRfS' Enforcement of Patient Dumping Act 'Tragic
Failure,' DAILY REPORT FOR ExEcuTivEs, April 24, 1991, at A-14.
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are unaware of the law or the rights that they have under the law." 6 The fact
that a greater number of patient dumping cases have been filed in Texas and
California is attributed to the fact that those states have enacted state patient
dumping laws which have been brought to the attention of the citizens." 6
States may enact their own patient dumping laws that are more vigorously
applied than the federal law as long as the state law is not in direct conflict with
EMTALA.Y"o

IV. THE OvERLAP BETWEEN EMTALA AND STATE MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE LAW

Courts have varied in interpreting the relationship between the EMTALA
"appropriate medical screening" standard and the medical malpractice standard
of care under state law. Some courts have held that EMTALA does not cover
a negligent medical screening, or even a screening that would clearly constitute
medical malpractice."'7 These courts emphasize that the purpose of EMTALA
is not to ensure that a patient receives an accurate diagnosis, but to ensure that
patients are given an appropriate screening without considering improper factors,
such as indigency, in the treatment."'r It is difficult to see how a medical

168. "The success of such a law as [EMTALA] depends on the perception by doctors and
hospitals of strong enforcement and penalties for violations, as well as on a broad campaign to
educate patients of their rights under the law." EQUAL ACCESS, supra note 2, at 20.
169. See infra notes 217-32 for a discussion of the California and Texas patient dumping laws.
170. 42 U.S.C.A. 1395dd(f) (West Supp. 1992). "The provisions of this section do not
preempt any State or local law requirement, except to the extent that the requirement directly
conflicts with a requirement of this section." Id.
171. Mitchell v. Candler General Hosp., U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5997 at *13 (S.D. Ga. April 2,
1992). The court emphasized that a claim under EMTALA does not incorporate state medical
malpractice law into the inquiry whether an appropriate medical screening was provided. Id.
In Baber v. Hosp. Corp. ofAmetica, the court stated:
While EMTALA requires a hospital emergency department to apply its standard
screening uniformly, it does not guarantee that the emergency personnel will correctly
diagnose a patient's condition as a result of this screening. The statutory language
clearly indicates that EMT'ALA does not impose on hospitals a national standard of care
in screening patients. Had Congress intended to require hospitals to provide a
screening examination which comported with generally accepted medical standards, it
could have clearly specified a national standard.
Baber v. Hospital Corp. of America, 977 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1992) (concluding that, "Ms. Baber's
screening was not so substandard as to amount to no screening at all"). See also Woessner v.
Freeport Memorial Hosp., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160 at * 10 (W.D. IM. Jan. 11, 1993). The
Woessner court stated, "Mhe issue is not whether the hospital conformed to a standard of care as
recognized under state negligence law, but whether the hospital conformed to its own standard
emergency room procedures for treating similarly situated patients." Id.
172. Jones v. Wake County Hosp. Sys., 786 F. Supp. 538 (E.D.N.C. 1991). However, basing
the EMTALA cause of action on whether improper factors were considered in the treatment becomes
increasingly difficult in light of decisions holding that indigency is not required to be a factor alleged
in a cause of action for patient dumping. See supra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
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screening could be appropriate if it is inaccurate. The only way to determine
that someone is suffering from an emergency medical condition is to give them
a diagnosis that is accurate and will determine their state of health.
There are strategic advantages to bringing a cause of action for patient
dumping concurrently with a state medical malpractice claim. One attorney
stated that patient transfer violations are the second or third most common cause
of action in medical malpractice suits."73 Hospitals are more willing to settle
claims that involve patient dumping rather than going through a public trial. 74
In addition, the plaintiff can bring the cause of action in federal court instead of
state court, where traditional claims of medical malpractice must be
brought.' 75 Procedural requirements such as submission of the medical
malpractice claim to a review board may also be waived in federal court if the
federal patient dumping law is found to preempt the state procedural rule. 6
The plaintiff may have a further advantage because under EMTALA the plaintiff
can recover against the hospital, while under general medical malpractice law
the plaintiff would only have a cause of action against the physician. 77
However, recent cases have held that a hospital can be found liable for the
common law negligence of emergency room physicians based on a duty on the
part of the hospital to supervise the physicians."

173. Terese Hudson, Attorneys FearPatient Transfer Claims in Medical Malpractice Cases,
HOSPITALS, April 5, 1991, at 44.
174. Id.
175. Demetrios G. Metropoulos, Son of Cobra: The Evolution of a FederalMalpracticeLaw,
45 STAN. L. Ray. 263, 284 (1992). "Two benefits that have already been realized in the federal
forum are liberal notice pleading rules and a federal court's wide latitude in admitting expert
testimony. This latter advantage is especially important because expert testimony is often essential
to prove professional negligence." Id. at 285.
Counsel for the Chicago-based American Hospital Association stated, "These lawsuits are
examples of malpractice cases getting into federal court. Using the statute just to get into federal
court to avoid medical liability reforms or take advantage of federal court rules of discovery, for
example, just uses up everybody's resources for cases that should be in state court." Eleanor
Kerlow, How To Beat A State Malpractice Cap; Plaintiffs Bar Turns To Patient Dumping Law,
LEGAL Tims, September 14, 1992, at 2.
176. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
177. Metropoulos, supra note 175, at 284.
In a state medical malpractice action, the plaintiff usually can recover only from the
negligent physician. The traditional tort doctrine of respondeat superior, or employer
liability for employee torts, seldom applies to hospitals because they usually do not
employ physicians. Instead, hospitals merely grant physicians the privilege of using
hospital facilities as independent contractors.
Id.
178. Bost v. Riley, 262 S.E.2d 391 (N.C. App. 1980). The court stated, "[A] patient at a
modern day hospital has the reasonable expectation that the hospital will attempt to cure him....
The hospital has the duty to make a reasonable effort to monitor and oversee the treatment which
is prescribed and administered by physicians practicing at the facility." Id. at 396. See also Darling
v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (W11.1965) (finding the hospital
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The distinction between a patient who is suing under patient dumping laws
and malpractice is difficult to see in light of recent decisions holding that there
is no requirement that the plaintiff allege that indigency was a factor in the
denial of their emergency medical care."9 Further, recent decisions holding
that a patient who is admitted and treated, then becomes unstable, may have a
cause of action for patient dumping, blurs the medical malpractice overlap even
further. " Most plaintiffs bring concurrent actions for medical malpractice
and patient dumping under EMTALA.'g
In light of the confusion the courts have had in determining what constitutes
an appropriate medical screening under EMTALA, and what constitutes medical
malpractice, patient dumping laws should clearly state that the standard for an
appropriate medical screening in patient dumping is not a medical malpractice
standard. Garden variety medical malpractice claims should not be brought in
federal courts simply because a claim for patient dumping under EMTALA is
also being alleged. The patient dumping statutes could deter plaintiffs from
suing under EMTALA as an alternative to medical malpractice by lowering the
recovery amount under the patient dumping law. The purpose of the patient
dumping law is to deter hospitals from dumping patients, not to give plaintiffs
a double recovery for medical malpractice.
Because states have enacted several measures, such as state medical
malpractice caps on damages" and mandatory submission of claims to

negligent in failing to supervise a physician in the emergency room), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946
(1966).
179. See supra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of America, 977 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1992); Abercrombie
v. Osteopathic Hosp. Founders Assoc., 950 F.2d 676, 678 (10th Cir. 1991); Richardson v.
Southwest Mississippi Regional Medical Ctr., 794 F. Supp. 198, 201 (S.D. Miss. 1992); Foster v.
Lawrence Memorial Hosp., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15417 at *2 (D. Kan. Sept. 11, 1992); Coleman
v. McCurtain Memorial Medical Management, 771 F. Supp. 343 (E.D. Okla. 199 1); Jones v. Wake
County Hosp. Sys. Inc., 786 F. Supp. 538 (E.D.N.C. 1991); Sorrels v. Babcock, 733 F. Supp.
1189, 1191 (N.D. III. 1990).
182. For a detailed discussion of medical malpractice caps, see Walter Gellhom, Medical
MalpracticeLitigation (U.S.), Medical Mishap Compensation (N.Z), 73 CORNELL L. REv. 170
(1988); Amanda E. Haiduc, Note, A Tale of Three Damage Caps: Too Much, Too Little and Finally
Just Right, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REzv. 825 (1990); Nancy L. Manzer, 1986 Tort Reform Legislation:
A Systematic Evaluation of Caps on Damages and Limitations on Joint and Several Liability, 73
CORNELL L. REv. 628 (1988); Mitchell S. Berger, Note, Following the Doctor's Orders-Capson
Non-Economic Damages in Medical Malpractice Cases, 22 RuTGERS L.J. 173 (1991).
For a discussion of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, see Eleanor D. Kinney et al.,
Indiana'sMedicalMalpracticeAct: Results of a Three-Year Study, 24 IND. L. REv. 1275 (1991).
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medical review panels, 1" it is important that EMTALA not create a federal
cause of action for medical malpractice, which would not contain these stateenacted safeguards. The recent case of Powers v. Arlington Hospital,'"
demonstrates how a plaintiff can bring a cause of action under EMTALA and
recover more than four times the monetary amount that would be permitted by
the state medical malpractice laws."u The court in Powers ruled that a claim
for patient dumping under EMTALA is not limited to state medical malpractice
damages because EMTALA creates a federal cause of action, not a supplemental
state medical malpractice action."'n If exceptionally high awards are permitted
under patient dumping laws, it is likely that the ultimate result will be the
closure of hospitals and medical facilities due to financial burdens.'" This
result would not provide the needed assistance to the thousands of Americans
who require emergency medical care. In fact, such a result would have the
opposite effect by driving more marginally profitable hospitals out of business.
A reduction in the number of hospitals would only aggravate an already critical
problem for indigent persons and uninsured patients.
Indiana has interpreted the overlap between EMTALA and the state medical
malpractice claims in a conflicting manner. Indiana has ruled that recovery
under EMTALA is limited to Indiana's state limit on medical malpractice
damages.'"n However, Indiana has also ruled that a claim under EMTALA
does not incorporate Indiana's procedural requirements of submitting medical

183. Medical review panels are considered to be essential to malpractice cases because they help
to encourage settlement of lawsuits, therefore decreasing court costs and congestion. Jean A.
Macciaroli, Medical Malpractice Screening Panels: ProposedModel Legislation to Cure Judicial
/ils, 58 GEo. L.J. 181 (1990). See generally 80 A.L.R.3d 583 (1992) (discussing medical
malpractice screening panels).
184. 800 F. Supp. 1384 (E.D. Va. 1992). For a discussion of this case, see supra note 30 and
accompanying text.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1388-89. Prior to this decision, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia held that the maximum recovery under EMTALA for a pregnant woman who
was not properly stabilized by a hospital was limited to Virginia's state medical malpractice cap on
damages. Lee v. Alleghany Regional Hosp., 778 F. Supp. 900, 904 (W.D. Va. 1991).
187. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
188. Reid v. Indianapolis Osteopathic Medical Hosp., 709 F. Supp. 853, 855 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
The court emphasized that since EMTALA is silent on the issue of whether a cause of action for
personal harm from patient dumping includes state caps on medical malpractice damages, and given
the fact that Congress was aware of the state problems with excessive damage awards, the court held
that the federal statute incorporates Indiana's medical malpractice cap on damages. Id. The court
went on to say that EMTALA does not incorporate Indiana's procedural requirements in malpractice
cases, and that on such procedural provisions EMTALA preempts state law. Id.
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malpractice cases to a review panel.'" It is difficult to see the distinction
between a claim for medical malpractice and a claim for patient dumping. Even
under the Indiana approach, which limits the damages to the state medical
malpractice cap on damages, it appears that a plaintiff could recover up to the
monetary cap under both a medical malpractice claim and a claim under
EMTALA.
Steps should be taken to prevent the "personal harm " "9° claims brought
under EMTALA from creating a federal medical malpractice claim. The federal
courts should not be interpreting what a medical malpractice standard of care is
while ruling on whether an appropriate medical screening'91 was given under
EMTALA. The courts have been unable to accurately determine what standards
are to apply in an EMTALA appropriate screening case, and how those
standards differ from a medical malpractice standard. " Thus, additional
legislation is needed in this area to provide courts, hospitals, physicians, and
patients with clear guidelines as to the standard for bringing a patient dumping
action for an inappropriate medical screening.
Indiana has recognized the inevitable overlap between EMTALA and state
medical malpractice claims by determining that medical malpractice caps on
damages apply to patient dumping claims.'
This recognition should be taken
further by the Indiana legislature, and it should be established that a claim for
patient dumping is not a claim for medical malpractice, even though there is a
clear overlap between the two causes of action. This overlap can be
acknowledged without allowing two recoveries for medical malpractice, resulting
in high awards against the medical facilities and ultimately possible closure of
such facilities. Indiana should create its own patient dumping statute and
provide that violation of that statute is negligence per se in a cause of action for
medical malpractice. Medical facilities will still be deterred from patient
dumping if a violation of the patient dumping law is found to be negligence per
se for a medical malpractice claim. This new statute should be enacted at the
state level so that its provisions can be properly monitored and enforced in a

189. Id. See also HCA Health Services of Indiana v. Gregory, 596 N.E.2d 974 (Ind. Ct. App.
1992). The court held that the two year statute of limitations set forth in EMTALA was in direct
conflict with the state procedural requirement, so the federal provision prevails. Id.
The medical review panel in Indiana consists of one attorney and three health care providers.
IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9.3 (1992). The review panel gives its expert opinion on whether the
defendant met the appropriate standards of care in the case. Id. § 16-9.5-9.7. Indiana requires that
all cases against health care providers begin with an evaluation by the medical review panel, unless
all of the parties involved waive the requirement in writing. Id. § 16-9.5-9-2.
190. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) (West 1992).
191. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd(a) (West 1992).
192. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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manner that the federal statutes have not been able to achieve."
V. THE STATE RESPONSE TO PATIENT DUMPING

A.

The Common Law Approach

The foundation case establishing that a hospital has a duty to render
emergency care to a patient in an emergency condition is Wilmington General
Hospital v. Manlove.'" This ruling was based on an implied duty of care,
premised on the fact that patients rely on hospitals to provide emergency
care. 9' In contrast, the Supreme Court of Alabama has held that there is no
duty on the part of a hospital to provide medical care unless a person is a patient
of the hospital."r The court explained that when a hospital renders partial
treatment and then transfers a patient, the hospital is not liable for any
after-effects the patient experiences as long as the treatment the hospital
provided did not create a condition that was extremely dangerous without further

service.'"
Even courts that are willing to establish a duty on the part of a hospital to
render emergency care have held that there is no duty on the part of a physician

194. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Hill-Burton Act; see
supra notes 160-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of EMTALA.
195. 174 A.2d 135 (Del. 1961). A detailed discussion of the development of the common law
duty of care in emergencies is beyond the scope of this note, but see Karen H. Rothenberg, Who
Cares?; The Evolution of the Legal Duty to ProvideEmergency Care, 26 HOUS. L. REV. 21 (1989);
Denise H. Field & Colleen M. Margiotta, Comment, To Treat or Not to Treat: A Hospital'sDuty
to ProvideEmergency Medical Care, 15 U.C.D. L. REv. 1047 (1982); Michael A. Dowell, Indigent
Access to Hospital Emergency Room Services, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 483 (1984).
196. Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135, 139 (Del. 1961).
197. Harper v. Baptist Medical Center-Princeton, 341 So.2d 133, 134 (Ala. 1976). This case
involved a patient who had a severed popliteal artery below his knee and was taken to the Baptist
Medical Center for treatment. The Baptist emergency room provided treatment for four hours and
then sent the patient to Mercy Hospital, a charitable hospital, because the patient did not have
hospital insurance. Id. Mercy Hospital performed surgery on the patient's knee. The patient
suffers from a permanent limp and constant pain. The evidence produced suggested that the patient's
medical problems were a result of the initial accident he was involved in and not the medical
treatment rendered. Id.
198. Id. The court's statement gives the hospital a considerable amount of leeway given the
fact that the purpose of a hospital is to make sure that patients get treatment and recover, not to
make sure they do not contribute to the injury the person is suffering from. A hospital should be
required in emergency situations to render care that will prevent injury, and transfers should only
be permissible when such an emergency situation exists if the transfer is being done for medical, not
financial, reasons.
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in Hiser v. Randolph,"

the

Arizona Supreme Court found that a doctor who worked for a hospital that had
by-laws stating that patients would be given the best emergency room care, and
that emergency care should be rendered as soon as possible after the patients
arrival, was personally bound to ensure that such care was provided to
patients.20
Arizona has been relatively aggressive in its attempt to deter hospitals from
dumping patients.'
The Arizona Supreme Court has held that public policy
requires private and public hospitals to provide emergency care to all patients
and that a patient may be transferred only if the transfer can be completed

without the patient risking unreasonable harm to life or health.'
Arizona
Revised Statute section 11-297.01(C) states that a private hospital that renders
care to an indigent patient may recover its costs for such services from the
county.A' The county is also financially responsible for any emergency care

199. It has been stated: "The general rule is that a medical practitioner is free to contract for
his services as he sees fit and in the absence of prior contractual obligations, he can refuse to treat
a patient, even under emergency situations." Findlay v. Board of Supervisors of Mohave County,
230 P.2d 526 (Ariz. 1951); Childs v. Weis, 440 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969). Section 5 of
the American Medical Association Ethics Code requires physicians to render emergency service to
the best of their ability. Agnew v. Parks, 343 P.2d 118 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Hurley v.
Eddingfield, 59 N.E. 1058 (Ind. 1901).
200. 617 P.2d 774 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980).
201. Id. at 277.
202. See Timothy G. Himes, Comment, "No Dumping Allowed": Has Arizona Solved the
PatientDumping Problem?, 21 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1137 (1989).
203. Thompsonv. Sun City Hosp., 688 P.2d 605, 609 (Ariz. 1984). The court went on to state
that a physician does not have a specific duty to render emergency care, and that any duty of care
a physician owes is measured by what is usually done in the profession. Id. at 612.
204. The Arizona statute states:
The county shall be liable for payment of all costs retroactive to the inception of
treatment incurred by a private hospital, a hospital operated by a university or health
care provider licensed and arising from emergency treatment and medical care
administered at such hospital for a patient qualified for such care and treatment under
the provisions of this article on compliance with subsection C and in either of the
following circumstances:
1. When the emergent condition of the patient is such that it is deemed
medically inadvisable to transport the patient from the private hospital or
hospital operated by a university for further treatment.
2. When the county does not move the patient from the private hospital or
hospital operated by a university within twelve hours after being notified by
the private hospital or hospital operated by a university authorities of the
location and condition of the patient.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-297.01(B) (West Supp. 1992).
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an ambulance service provides for an indigent patient.'
In addition to
provisions for emergency care, the Arizona Supreme Court has held that a
private hospital may not cease giving medical care to an indigent patient who is
seriously ill even when there is no longer an emergency condition.'
B. State Statutory Response
Twenty-one states have responded to the patient dumping problem through
legislation.'
Many of the state statutes are brief and do not define the term

205. The statute providing for emergency services from ambulances states:
When an indigent emergency medical patient is received by an emergency receiving
facility from an ambulance with necessary medical equipment and supplies to provide
emergency medical services the county shall be liable to the ambulance service for the
cost of transporting the patient and to the facility for the reasonable costs of all medical
services rendered to such indigent by the facility until such patient is transferred by the
county to the nearest county hospital, or some other facility designated by the county.
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1837(A) (West 1991).
206. St. Joseph's Hosp. & Medical Center v. Maricopa County, 688 P.2d 986, 990 (Ariz.
1984). This case involved an indigent patient who was in an automobile accident and received
emergency medical care at a private hospital. After the emergency medical condition was stabilized,
the patient remained at the private hospital and received nursing care. Id. The county hospital
refused to accept the patient as a transfer. The court found that the private hospital had a duty to
continue treatment of the patient, but that the county was responsible for paying for the costs of the
treatments at the private hospital. Id.
207. The state statutes provide as follows:
California, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317 (1991) states:
Emergency services and care should be provided to any person requesting the services
or care, or for whom services or care is requested, for any condition in which the
person is in danger of loss of life, or serious injury or illness, at any health facility
licensed under this chapter that maintains an emergency department.
Id. § 1317(a). The Code further provides that emergency services should not be based on race,
ethnicity, religion, national origin, citizenship, age, sex, preexisting medical condition, physical or
mental handicap, insurance status, economic status, or ability to pay for medical services. Id. §
1317(b). The code also defines emergency condition:
[E]mergency medical condition means a medical condition manifesting itself by acute
symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of
immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in any of the
following:
(1) Placing the patient's health in serious jeopardy.
(2) Serious impairment to bodily functions.
(3) Serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part.
(4) Active labor means a labor at a time in which either of the following
would occur:
(1) There is inadequate time to effect safe transfer to another
hospital prior to delivery.
(2) A transfer may pose a threat to the health and safety of the
patient or the unborn child.
Id. § 1317(b). Specific procedures to be followed if a patient is transferred are also provided. Id.
§ 1317.2. A violation of the code may result in civil fines of up to $25,000, but the maximum
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cumulative fine under the code and the federal statute, EMTALA, is $30,000. Id. § 1317.6.
Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 31-8-42 (1991), requires any hospital with an emergency service
to provide care to a woman in active labor if the woman is a resident of the state, and such services
are usually and customarily provided within the medical facility. Id. Provisions are also established
that if a transfer of a woman in active labor is made the facility must contact the receiving facility,
arrange suitable transportation, and send information on the patient's condition and history to the
receiving hospital. Id. § 31-8-42(2). The statute allows for a cause of action for damages or other
appropriate relief if a hospital violates the statute. Id. § 31-8-45 (1991). A fine of $500 per
violation may also be imposed. Id. § 31-8-46.
Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 321-232 (Michie 1993), states:
No ambulance services, or any other medical services available from or under the
authority of this chapter shall be denied to any person on the basis of the ability of the
person to pay therefor or because of the lack of prepaid health care coverage or proof
of such ability or coverage.
Id. The Code does not provide for any cause of action if medical care is denied based on inability
to pay for the services.
Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 111 1/2, para. 86 (1991), provides:
Every hospital required to be licensed by the Department of Public Health.., which
provides general medical and surgical hospital services shall provide [such services] to
any applicant who applies for the same in case of injury or acute medical condition
where the same is liable to cause death or severe injury or serious illness.
Id. A violation of the statute may result in a fine not to exceed $10,000 per violation. Id. at par.
87.
Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216B.400 (Baldwin 1991), provides: "Where a person
has been determined to be in need of emergency care by any person with admitting authority, no
such person shall be denied admission by reason only of his inability to pay for such services to be
rendered by the hospital." Id. § 216B.400(1). A violation of this statute may be punished by a fine
of not less than $100 and not more than $500. Id. § 216B.990. It is important to note that the
statute imposes a subjective definition of a medical emergency and that no relief is provided if an
admitting authority claims there was no emergency. Further, a fine of $100 to $500 is likely to be
more appealing to a hospital than rendering care to an indigent patient.
Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. § 40:2113.4 (1992), requires a hospital which receives aid from
the state to provide emergency room services to all persons that reside in the territorial area of the
hospital regardless of whether the person is covered by insurance. Id. § 40:2113.4(A). Services
shall not be withheld based on race, religion, national ancestry, age, sex, physical condition, or
economic status. Id. An emergency condition is defined as one which places the person in
imminent danger of death or permanent disability, or in the case of rape. Id. § 40:2113.4(B). The
penalty that is imposed if this statute is violated is that the facility will no longer receive referrals
from the Department of Health and Human Resources. Id. § 40:2113.4(A).
Massachusetts, MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 111, § 70E (Law. Co-op. 1993), provides:
Every patient or resident of a facility shall have the right to prompt life saving treatment
in an emergency situation without discrimination on account of economic status or
source of payment and without delaying treatment for purposes of prior discussion of
the source of payment unless such delay can be imposed without material risk to his
health ....
Id. The statute provides that any person whose rights are violated may bring a civil action. Id.
This statute makes no attempt to define what an emergency situation is, and the allowance of delay
in services is provided in such a vague statement that it is likely that hospitals will continue to delay
treatment, or refuse to render it, based on an individual's economic status.
Michigan, MicH. COvw. LAws § 333.20921 (1993), requires ambulance services to provide
life support without prior inquiry of ability to pay. Id. § 333.20921 (1)(e). This statute applies only
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in the narrow amount of cases that deal with patients being dumped from ambulance services and
provides no assistance to patients who are dumped from emergency rooms which is where the heart
of the patient dumping problem lies. In addition, this statute provides for no specific remedy or
penalty if there is a violation.
Missouri, Mo. REV. STAT. § 205.989(1) (1992), provides, "No person because of inability
to pay shall be denied the services of a community health center, mental health clinic, or other
public facility or not for profit corporation in which a county or participating counties have
established services or provided funds." Id. The main weakness of this statute is that many patient
dumping cases take place from private hospitals, not public facilities, and this statute does nothing
to alleviate this problem. In addition, no remedy is given for a violation.
Nevada, NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 439B.410 (Michie 1991), provides that hospitals have a
duty to provide emergency services and care, and that they may not refuse to treat a patient in need
of emergency care, or transfer a patient unless the patient is medically fit for the transfer, the

receiving facility has accepted the transfer, the patient has had an explanation for the transfer and
has consented to it. Id. A hospital that violates this provision causing another hospital to have to
render care may recover three times the charges of the care plus reasonable attorneys fees from the
hospital that wrongfully discharged the patient.
Id. The key terms in the statute such as
"emergency services and care" and "medically fit" are defined in the statute. Id. A violation of
the statute may result in criminal penalties or denial, revocation, or suspension of the hospital's
license, and criminal penalties, disciplinary penalties, or licensure denial against the physician. Id.
New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151:21 (1992), states, "The patient shall be
transferred or discharged only for medical reasons, for his welfare or that of other patients, if the
facility ceases to operate, or for nonpayment for the patient's stay except as prohibited by the Social
Security Act." Id. The statute further provides, "The patient shall not be denied appropriate care
on the basis of race, religion, color, national origin, sex, age, disability, marital status, sexual
preference, or source of payment." Id. The statute provides for no remedy if there is a violation.
New York, N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW 2805-b (Consol. 1993), provides:
Every general hospital shall admit any person who is in need of immediate
hospitalization with all convenient speed and shall not before admission question the
patient or any member of his or her family concerning insurance, credit or payment of
charges, provided, however, that the patient or a member of his or her family shall
agree to supply such information promptly after the patient's admission.
Id. The statute also states that transfers shall be made:
[O]niy when acceptance of an additional critical patient may endanger the life of that
patient or the life of another patient. A request for the diversion of other emergency
patients shall only be made when all appropriate beds are filled and shall be withdrawn
as soon as a bed is available.
Id.
Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 441.094 (1991), provides that a hospital licensed by the Health
Division may not deny care to a person that the admitting physician diagnoses as being in need of
emergency medical services, and that the emergency medical services customarily provided by the
hospital cannot be denied to a person because they are unable to establish that they have the ability
to pay for the services. Id. § 441.094(1). The statute also defines emergency medical services as
those which must be provided to sustain life, prevent serious permanent disfigurement or loss or
impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ, or provision of care to a woman in active
labor. Id. § 441.094(4). One problem with this statute is that whether a person has an emergency
medical condition is completely within the discretion of the admitting physician. Another problem
is that no provision for a remedy or cause of action is given in the statute.
Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35 § 449.8 (1992), provides:
The general assembly finds that every person in this Commonwealth should receive
timely and appropriate health care services from any provider operating in this
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Commonwealth; that, as a continuing condition of licensure, each provider should offer
and provide medically necessary, lifesaving and emergency health care services to every
person in this Commonwealth, regardless of financial status or ability to pay; and that
health care facilities may transfer patients only in instances where the facility lacks the
staff or facilities to properly render definitive treatment.
Id. This statute is weak in that it does not attempt to define any of the key terms it is using such
as what emergency medical care consists of specifically. In addition, no remedy is given and there
is no apparent means to enforce the statute.
Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-17-26 (1991) states:
Every health care facility that has an emergency medical care unit shall provide to every
person prompt life saving medical care treatment in an emergency, and a sexual assault
examination for victims of sexual assault without discrimination on account of economic
status or source of payment, and without delaying treatment for the purpose of a prior
discussion of the source of payment unless the delay can be imposed without material
risk to the health of the person.
Id. The enforcement procedures available are to report a violation to the director of the state
department of health and the director will do what they deem to be appropriate.
South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-7-260 (Law Co-op 1991), provides:
No person, regardless of his ability to pay or county of residence, may be denied
emergency care if a member of the admitting hospital's medical staff, or in the case of
a transfer, a member of the accepting hospital's medical staff determines that the person
is in need of emergency care. Emergency care means treatment which is usually and
customarily available at the respective hospital and that must be provided immediately
to sustain a person's life, to prevent serious impairment or disfigurement, or loss or
impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ, or to provide for the care of
a woman in active labor if the hospital is so equipped and, if the hospital is not so
equipped to provide necessary treatment to allow the woman to travel to a more
appropriate facility without undue risk of serious harm.
Id. The statute's enforcement provisions include that a hospital's license status may be affected if
there is a violation, and also that a civil penalty of up to $10,000 may be imposed against the
hospital. Id. § 44-7-260(E). Again, under this statute whether an emergency medical condition
exists is for the hospital's staff to determine. Id.
Texas, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 311.022 (1993), provides:
No officer, employee or member of the hospital medical staff of a general hospital shall
deny emergency medical services available at the hospital to a person diagnosed by a
licensed physician as requiring emergency services because the person is unable to
establish his ability to pay for the services or because of race, religion, or national
ancestry. In addition, the person needing the services may not be subjected to arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable discrimination based upon age, sex, physical condition or
economic status.
Id. The statute goes on to define emergency services, and states that criminal penalties of a class
B misdemeanor to a third degree felony can be imposed for violation of the statute. Id.
Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-8-8 (1992), provides, "Emergency medical services shall be
provided to all patients in need of such services to sustain life or prevent loss of life without regard
to race, sex, color, creed, or prior inquiry as to ability to pay." Id. The statute makes no attempt
to define what emergency medical services consist of and no provisions are made for any cause of
action that will be taken if a violation occurs.
Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 1852(8) (1992), lists rights that a patient has and includes
the right of the patient to receive complete information and explanation regarding a transfer, and also
provides that the facility the patient is being transferred to must accept the patient. Id. This
legislation does not appear to have any impact on the requirement that medical facilities render care
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"emergency medical condition.""
States that do define emergency medical
condition often leave the determination of that condition to the physician or
hospital.'
The use of a subjective test may weaken the purpose of the patient
dumping legislation because all the medical facility has to do to avoid liability
is classify indigent patients they do not wish to treat as being in a
non-emergency medical condition. An objective test for an emergency medical
condition would be more effective, allowing a judge and jury to determine if a
medical emergency in fact existed and whether the hospital failed to treat the
medical condition properly under state law.
State patient dumping laws are also weakened by the fact that ten of the
twenty-one states that have patient dumping statutes provide no cause of action

to a patient since all that is required is an explanation to the patient and approval by the accepting
hospital. In addition, the patient is given no course of action if their rights are violated.
Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. § 146.301 (1989-1990), states:
No hospital providing emergency services may refuse emergency treatment to any sick
or injured person. In addition, no hospital providing emergency services may delay
emergency treatment to a sick or injured person until credit checks have been made if
the delay is likely to cause increased medical complications, permanent disability or
death.
Id. The remedy for a violation is a fine of $1000 for each offense. Id. This statute appears to give
a broad definition of emergency services. Most state statutes have included some provision defining
the seriousness of the injury or illness, thereby narrowing the care the hospital is required to
provide.
Wyoming, WYO. STAT. § 35-2-115 (1992) provides:
Emergency service and care shall be provided, at the regularly established charges of
the hospital, to any person requesting such services or care, or for whom such services
or care is requested, for any condition in which the person is in danger of loss of life,
or serious injury or illness, at any hospital licensed in the state of Wyoming that
maintains and operates emergency services to the public when such hospital has
appropriate facilities and qualified personnel available to provide such services of care.
Id. The statute goes on to say that if the hospital decides they have inadequate personnel, or that
they do not have the proper equipment or facilities, than the hospital and its employees shall not be
liable for failure to render emergency care. Id. Under this statute all the hospital has to do if they
do not wish to treat an indigent patient is to say that they did not have the proper facilities or
personnel on staff to render treatment. It appears from the statute if the hospital established this as
the reason they did not even attempt to render emergency care, then there can be no relief obtained
by a patient who is dumped.
208. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-8-42 (1991), HAW. REV. STAT. § 321-232 (Michie 1993), and KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 216B.400 (Baldwin 1993) make no attempt to define the crucial term medical
emergency condition. MASS. ANN. LAWs ch. 111, § 70E (Law.Co-op. 1993), MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 333.20921 (1993), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35 § 449.8 (1992), R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-26
(1991), and UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-8-8 (1992) provide that emergency medical services are required
to be rendered if there is a need to prevent a loss of life. These definitions seem to apply in a
narrow band of cases, and don't appear to cover someone who is suffering from a serious illness,
or a woman who is in active labor.
209. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 216B.400 (Baldwin 1993), OR. REV. STAT. § 441.094 (1991),
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-7-260 (1990).
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or penalty if emergency medical services are refused.21 Eleven of the states
that have patient dumping statutes have remedies available for a violation, but
six of those statutes have weak remedies that are unlikely to deter a facility from
dumping a patient."' For example, the fine in Kentucky for patient dumping
is no less than $100 and no more than $500.2 Similarly, Georgia provides
Rhode Island's patient dumping statute has a vague
for a $500 fine."'
provision that permits the health director of the State Department to receive a
report of violations and permits the director to take whatever action is deemed
to be necessary.2"4 The remote threat that a violation would be reported and
investigated is not an effective way to prevent medical facilities from dumping
indigent patients.
Given the fact that indigent patients who are denied emergency medical care
will probably not have the necessary funds to bring a private cause of action, the
state patient dumping laws should include a provision that attorneys fees will be
paid if the plaintiff successfully shows improper denial of care. It is also
important that states create aggressive enforcement procedures that include a
notification process so that indigent patients will be aware of
comprehensive
215
their rights.
Louisiana's patient dumping statute states that if a medical facility violates
the provisions, the Department of Health and Human Resources will not make
any more client referrals to that facility. 2 6 Again, in light of the great
expense a facility faces in rendering treatment to an indigent person with no
ready means to pay for the services, anti-dumping sanctions such as these will
not deter medical facilities from dumping patients.
California, Nevada, and Texas have developed aggressive remedies to solve
the patient dumping problem. The California statute provides a fine against the

210. HAW. REv. STAT. § 321-232 (Michie 1993), MIcH. CoMP. LAWS § 333.20921 (1993),
Mo. REv. STAT. § 205.989(1) (1992), N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 151:21 (1992), N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW 2805-b (Consol. 1993), OR. REv. STAT. § 441.094 (1991), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35
§ 449.8 (1992), UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-8-8 (1992), VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 1852(8) (1992),
Wyo. STAT. § 35-2-115 (1992).
211. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-8-46 (1991), KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 216B.990(3) (Baldwin 1993),
LA. REv. STAT. § 40:2113.4 (1992), MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, § 70E (Law. Co-op. 1993), R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 23-17-26 (1991), Wis. STAT. § 146.301 (1989-1990).
212. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 216B.990(3) (Baldwin 1993).
213. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-8-46 (1991).
214. R.I. GEN. LAWS 23-17-26(b) (1991).
215. EQUAL ACCESS, supra note 2, at 11. "No matter how strong the statute, it is useless
without enforcement .... It can only serve as a deterrent if it is enforced. A law sitting quietly on
the books will not serve as an obstacle to violations." Id.
216. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:2113.4(A) (1992).
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hospital of $25,000 per violation.217 In addition, a physician may be fined up
to $5000 for patient dumping.218 If medical facilities are made aware of this
kind of fine, and the fines are actually enforced against facilities that commit a
violation, it is very likely that the number of patients dumped each year will
decrease. In addition to a high fine, California also outlines the procedure to
be followed whenever a patient is transferred, including notification to the
transferring hospital and acceptance of the patient by the transferring
hospital." 9 The California statute also requires hospitals licensed by the state
to adopt regulations that include a policy that prohibits discrimination in the
provision of emergency care.?2
Additionally, the California statute requires that hospitals explain to patients
the reason for a transfer and the person's right to emergency care."
The
statute also mandates that all hospitals must post notice in the emergency rooms
informing patients of their rights to emergency care.'
If a hospital fails to
adopt the policies required by the statute, the hospital is given a notice that their
regulations do not meet the state law, and then, if after sixty days the hospital
has not changed its regulations, a fine of $1000 per day is imposed. 3
Nevada and Texas impose criminal sanctions against a medical facility that
dumps patients. 4 Under the Nevada statute, criminal penalties are available
against both the hospital and the physician, and the license of both the hospital
and physician may also be affected. 22 Nevada also provides that when a
hospital violates the statute and refuses to render care to an indigent patient, the

217. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1317.6(a) (1991). In addition, the statute lists factors
that are to be considered in determining the amount of the fine to be imposed:
(1) Whether the violation was knowing or unintentional.
(2) Whether the violation resulted or was reasonably likely to result in a medical hazard
to the patient.
(3) The frequency or gravity of the violation.
(4) Other civil fines that have been imposed under Section 1395 of Title 42, EMTALA.

Id.
218. Id. § 1317.6(c). California is one of the few states that imposes a fine against physicians
under its patient dumping statutes.
219. Id. § 1317.2.
220. Id. § 1317.3Qb). Further, the statute provides that physicians who are on call at the
hospital cannot discriminate against patients when they are rendering emergency care based on the
patient's race, ethnicity, religion, citizenship, age, sex, preexisting medical condition, physical or
mental handicap, insurance status, economic status, ability to pay for medical services. Id. §
1317.3(c).
221. Id. § 1317.3(d).
222. Id. § 1317.3(d).
223. Id. § 1317.3(e).
224. NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 439B.410(6-7) (Michie 1991), TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 311.022(2 d-e) (1993).
225. NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 439B.410(6-7) (Michie 1991).
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hospital that does provide the care may recover three times the charges of the
care and reasonable attorneys fees from the hospital that refused to provide the
required care.'2 However, in reality many facilities will not bring a cause of
action against one another due to professional camaraderie.'
The Texas statute provides that no officer, employee, or member of a
hospital medical staff shall deny emergency services to a patient based on the
fact that the patient is not able to pay for the services.'
If this statute is
violated, criminal penalties from a class B misdemeanor to a third degree felony
charge may be imposed. 9 The fear of having a criminal penalty imposed is
a powerful deterrent that may prevent hospitals from dumping patients. The
federal statute EMTALA originally contained criminal sanctions.'
However,
the House of Representatives revised the legislation and deleted the criminal
sanctions.2' The House explained that a criminal negligence standard would
penalize medical facilities with criminal sanctions for actions that may have been
a simple mistake, and found that such a provision was too harsh.' 2 In
addition, there were constitutional problems with a criminal penalty under the
void-for-vagueness provision since key terms, such as appropriate medical
screening, are difficult to define precisely. 3
Indiana has not taken any steps through the common law or through
statutory enactments to alleviate the problem of patient dumping. In light of the
failure of the federal regulations with the Hill-Burton ActP and
EMTALA, 2 5 Indiana should adopt its own patient dumping laws to provide
emergency medical care to all people, whether they are indigent or wealthy. A
state patient dumping statute can be enforced more effectively than a national
federal standard. As a matter of public policy, Indiana should adopt a statute

226. Id. § 439B.410(3).

227. EQUAL AccESS, supra note 2, at 18. The House Report explained that receiving hospitals
may be reluctant to report violations of patient dumping because of the need for good relationships
between medical facilities, and that facilities do not want to "squeal on one another."
Id.

Therefore, there must be alternative objective procedures to ensure that patients are not dumped
since relying on medical facilities to turn one another in does not appear to be the answer to the
problem.

228.
229.
230.
730.
231.
232.

TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 311.022 (1993).
Id.
H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 726Id.
Id. at 729.

233. Id. The House explained that what constitutes an appropriate medical screening means
different things to different people, and that a criminal negligence standard would be too vague and
would cause people to guess at what is appropriate medical care under the statute. Id.

234. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 160-68 and accompanying text.
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that provides for emergency medical services to be rendered to all patients who
require such care.
In addition, Indiana should include comprehensive
enforcement provisions.
VI.

PROPOSED RESOLUTION

This Note proposes that Indiana adopt a patient dumping statute that is more
vigorous in its application and enforcement procedures than previous federal
attempts to regulate the problem. Furthermore, Indiana should directly address
the problem of the overlap between medical malpractice and patient dumping
claims.'
The following proposed statute creates remedies that will encourage
plaintiffs to properly bring medical malpractice claims in Indiana state court, not
as attached claims to EMTALA.
PROPOSED MODEL STATUTE FOR INDIANA REQUIREMENT
OF EMERGENCY CARE AND ADEQUATE TRANSFERS
OF PATIENTS

A. Purpose
The purpose of this statute is to deter the dumping of patients and assure
that all people are provided with emergency medical health care regardless of
their ability to pay. In addition, this statute is designed to prevent discrimination
in treatment based on physical or mental condition, sex, race, national origin,
age, or handicap. The statute is designed to deter patient dumping, not to
compensate individuals for harm they have suffered due to improper medical
treatment. Therefore, this statute sets its own limits on civil monetary amounts
that may be recovered, and recovery is not measured by Indiana medical
malpractice caps on damages. In addition, claims under this statute are not
required to be submitted to the Indiana medical review panel.
B. Legal Obligations to Provide Emergency Care
(1) All hospitals, medical facilities, physicians, medical staff, and ambulance
services and employees are required to render care to any person who is in an
emergency medical condition without regard to a person's ability to pay,
physical or medical condition, sex, race, national origin, age, or handicap. If
any hospital, medical facility, physician, medical staff, or ambulance service or
employee transfers a patient who is suffering from a medical emergency
condition, and the transfer is likely to result in any kind of deterioration of the
person's physical or medical condition, such a medical facility will be sanctioned

236. See supra notes 171-94 and accompanying text.
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under this statute for patient dumping. When a patient is transferred while in
a medical emergency condition, it will be presumed under this statute that such
a transfer was an improper action by the transferring medical facility, and the
burden will be on that facility to show by a preponderance of the evidence that
the transfer was done for legitimate medical reasons that were in the patient's
best interest.
(2) All medical facilities and ambulance services are required to provide
all persons to whom treatment is rendered notice of the legal obligation such
facility has to provide emergency medical services. On an individual basis such
notice is to be provided in written or oral form and before treatment is rendered
unless that is impossible given the condition of the patient. In addition, each
facility is required to post notice in the emergency room, the waiting area for
the emergency room, the billing office, and any office that deals with financial
aid or payments, of its obligation to provide emergency care. A violation of this
provision will result in a civil monetary fine of up to $25,000 per violation.
C. Definitions
(1) Any individual who is refused emergency medical treatment may bring
a cause of action under this statute, and there is no requirement of an allegation
or proof of indigency to recover damages.
(2) A medical emergency condition exists when any patient suffers from
an illness or serious threat of harm to his or her body or organs, which may
result in death, disfigurement, extended health problems, serious pain, or
damage to bodily organs. In addition, any woman who has gone into labor is
deemed to be in an emergency medical condition, and if labor has begun it is
presumed that the woman should not be transferred unless the medical facility
can show that there was sufficient time to transfer the woman without
endangering the woman or the unborn child. Victims of child abuse or sexual
assault who come to a medical facility will also be considered to be in an
emergency medical condition. Whether an emergency medical condition existed
as required under this statute will be for the Judge or Jury to determine with the
assistance of the relevant records and experts in the field of Emergency
Medicine.
(3) To recover under this statute there is no requirement that the patient
arrive in the emergency room of the facility. If the facility operates clinics or
tertiary operator systems, the facility may be held liable for patient dumping that
occurs in those units as well as the main facility.
(4) A medical facility that refuses to accept a transfer of a patient in an
emergency medical condition will also be liable for patient dumping under this
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statute. Such actions constitute reverse patient dumping and are subject to the
same penalties under this statute.
D. Remedies
(1) A violation of this statute may result in a civil action being brought by
the individual who was refused treatment or the State Department of Health.
Recovery is limited to a maximum of $150,000 per violation. Two-thirds of the
monetary amount recovered will go to the individual who brings the suit and the
other one third will be placed in a State fund with the purpose of providing
health care for the indigent. If the action is brought by the state Department of
Health, the entire amount of the award will be placed in the fund for health care
for the indigent.
(2) A violation of this statute constitutes negligence per se in a cause of
This
action for medical malpractice for improper medical treatment.
presumption can be rebutted by the physician or hospital if they can show, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that the care rendered met the standard of
reasonableness in the profession.
(3) Any medical facility or physician with more than two violations under
this statute will be ineligible to receive payment from the indigent health care
fund for services they render to indigent patients.
(4) Any plaintiff who successfully shows that he or she was denied
emergency medical care in violation of this statute is entitled to reasonable
attorneys fees as part of the costs.
E. Comments
As a commentary to the proposed statute, the following examples are
intended to show how previous cases would yield a different result under the
proposed statute.
The case of Powers v. Arlington HospitaP"7 would have a different
outcome under this new statute. Under the proposed legislation, Powers, who
brought a patient dumping claim under EMTALA and recovered four million
dollars in damages, would recover only a maximum of $100,000 under the
proposed statute. Powers could then use the violation of EMTALA as
negligence per se in a medical malpractice claim against the hospital. When
Powers brought her medical malpractice claim all of the state safeguards against

237. 800 F. Supp. 1384 (E.D. Va. 1992). See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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malpractice claims, such as caps on damages and the requirement of submission
to a medical review board, would be in force.
In addition, the Indiana case of Reid v. Indianapolis Osteopathic Medical
Hospital' would be resolved differently under this proposed legislation.
There would be no need to classify patient dumping claims as limited by state
medical malpractice claims, making the federal claim a quasi-federal medical
malpractice cause of action. Instead, the maximum amount of fines under the
patient dumping statute is set at $150,000. If the plaintiff chooses to bring a
cause of action for medical malpractice under the state law, all of the procedural
safeguards such as malpractice caps and medical review boards will monitor the
case.
Moreover, this statute resolves the problem of requiring patients to allege
that they arrived at the hospital emergency room as a requirement for a patient
dumping claim. 9 The ruling in Johnson v. University Hospital' would be
reversed under this statute. A medical facility that operates an emergency
service outside the physical premises of its main facility can be held liable for
patient dumping under this statute from either its main facility or from ancillary
services the facility offers.
F. Analysis of ProposedLegislation
The proposed legislation is intended to avoid previous problems of patient
dumping regulations at both the federal and state level. First, the statute
clarifies that any individual may bring a cause of action for patient dumping.
There is no requirement that indigency or improper motive on the part of the
medical facility must be proven to state a cause of action for patient dumping.
In addition, a plaintiff is not required to show that they arrived in the
emergency room to state a cause of action. If arrival at the emergency room is
a factor that must be proven for a patient dumping claim, hospitals would be
well-advised to make such arrival a restricted process. Facilities could establish
tertiary operators to direct away patients they do not wish to treat. Moreover,
hospitals could keep patients in the waiting room or other area of the hospital
if they thought the patients would be likely candidates to be dumped.
The amount of recovery available under the proposed statute is limited so
that hospitals will not be burdened to the extent they must close down. Hospital
closures would only add to the problem of indigent access to health care.

238. 709 F. Supp. 853 (S.D. Ind. 1989). See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 119-50 and accompanying text.
240. 982 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1991). See supra notes 142-50 and accompanying text.
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Legislation must be created with cost containment problems of the hospitals
clearly in mind. Further, a penalty of $25,000 is imposed for failure to comply
with the notice provisions. This is a high monetary penalty because of the
importance of notifying indigent patients of their rights to health care.
VII. CONCLUSION

The federal responses to the patient dumping problem under EMTALA and
the Hill-Burton Act have failed to prevent patient dumping. State statutes have
had some success in eliminating the problem. The state level, where physician
licensing and regulations of hospitals are conducted, is the proper place to
address the patient dumping problem. In order to prevent excessive fines
against hospitals, resulting in closure of the facilities, Indiana should adopt
legislation clearly stating that a claim for patient dumping is not an alternative
route to collect more money for what is essentially a state medical malpractice
claim. It is important to separate the cause of action for patient dumping from
the cause of action for medical malpractice.
Patient dumping should be closely monitored, and patients must be made
aware of their rights under the patient dumping laws. Aggressive enforcement
of the proposed Indiana legislation should lead to a decrease in the number of
patients who are dumped each year. This will result in all Americans receiving
the medical emergency treatment they require.
Judith L. Dobbertin
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